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INTRODUCTION
The Russian Revolution was fought nnder the banner of Marxism.
I n the years of propaganda before the first World War the Bolshevist
Party came forward es the champion of Marxist ideas and tactics.
It worked along with the radical tendencies in the socialist parties
of Western Europe, which were alao steeped in Marxian theory,
whereas the Menshevist Party corresponded rather to the reformist
tendencies over here. I n theoretical wntroversies the Bolshevist
authors, besidesl the so-cded Austrian and Dutch schools of Marxism,
came forward as the defenders of rigid Marxist doctrines. In the
Revolution the Bolshevists, who now had adopted the name of Communist Party, could win because they put up as the leading principle
of their fight the class war of the working masses against the bourgeoisie. Thus Lenin and his party, in theory and prahtice, stood as
the foremast representatives of Marxism.
Then? however, a contradiction appeared. In Russia a system of
state-capitalism consolidated itself, not by deviating from but by following Lenin 's ideas (e.g. ip his ''State and Revolution ") . A new
dominating and exploiting claw came into power over the working
clam. But at the same time Marxism was fostered, and proclaimed
the fundamental basis of the Russian state. In Moscow a "MarxEngels Institute" was founded that collected with care and reverence
all the well-nigh lost and forgotten works and manuscripb of the
masters and published them' in excellent editions. Whereas the Communist Parties, directed by the Moscow Cornintern, refer to Marxism
as their guiding doctrine, they meet with more and more opposition
from the most advanced workers in Western Europe and America,
most radically from the ranks of Council-communism. These contradictions, extending over all important problems of life and of the
social stmggle, can be cleared up only by penetrating into the deepest,
i.e. the philosophical, principles of what is called Marxism in these
different trends of thought.

Lenin gave an exposition of his philosophical ideas in his work
and Empiriocriticism " that appeared in Russian in
1908, and was published in 1927 in German and in English- translations. Some of the Russian socialist intellectuals about 1904 had taken
an interest in modern Western natural philosophy, especially in the
ideas of Ernst Mach, and tried to combine these with Marxism. A
kind of "Machism", with Bogdanov, Lenin's most intimate collaborator, and Lunatcharsb as spokesmen, developed as an influential
trend in the socialist party. After the first revolution the strife flared
up again, connected as it was with all the various tactical and practical
.differences in the socialist movement. Then Lenin took a decisive
stand against these deviations and, aided by Plechanov, the ablest
representative of Marxian theory among the Russians, soon succeeded
in destroying the influence of Machism in the socialist party.
I n the Introduction to the German and English editions of Lenin's
book, Deborin-at that time the official interpreter of Leninism, but
afterwards disgraced-exalts the importance of the collaboration of
the two foremost theoretical leaders for the definite victory of true
Marxism over all anti-marxist, reformist trends. -

''Materialism

"Lenin's book is not only an important contribution to philosbphy,
but it is also a remarkable document of an intra-party struggle which
was of utmost importance in strengthening the general philosophical
founbtibns of Marxism and Leninism, and which to a great degree
determined the subsequent growth of philosophical thought amongst
Unfortunately, matters are different beyond
the Russian Marxists.
where Kantian scholasticism and
the borders of the Soviet Union,
positivistic idealism are in full bloom."

...

.. .

Since the importance of Lenin's book is so strongly emphasized
here, it is necessary to make it the subject of a serious critical study.
The doctrine of Party-Communism of the Third International cannot
be judged adequately unless their philosophical basis is thoroughly
examined.
Marx's studies on society, which for a century now have been
dominating and shaping the workers' movement in increased measure,
took thiir form from German philosophy. They cannot be understood
without a study of the spiritual and political developments of the
European world. Thus it is with other social and philosophical trends
and with other schools of materialism developing besides Marxism.
Thus it is, too, with the theoretical ideas underlying the Russian revolution. Only by comparing these different systems of thought as to
their social origin and their philosophical contents can we arrive at
a well-founded judgment.

The evolution of Marx's ideas into what is now called Marxism
can be understood only in connection with the social and political
developments of the period in which they arose. It was the time when
industrial capitalism made its entry into Germany. This brought
about a growing opposition to the existing aristocratic absolutism.
The ascending bourgeois class needed freedom of trade and commerce,
favorable legislation, a government sympathetic to its interests, freedom of press and assembly, in order to secure its needs and desires
in an unhampered fight. Instead it found itself confronted with a
hostile regime, an omnipotent police, and a press censorship which .
suppressed every criticism of the reactionary government. The struggle between these forces, which led to the revolution of 1848, first had
to be conducted on a theoretical level, as a struggle of ideas and a
criticism of the prevailing system of ideas. The criticism of the young
bourgeois intelligentsia was directed mainly against religion and Hegelian philosophy.
Hegelian philosophy in which the self-development of the "Absolute Idea" creates the world and then, as developing world, enters
the consciousness of man, was the philosophical guise suited to the
Christian world of the epoch of the "Restoration" after 1815. Religion handed down by past generations served, as always, as the theoretical basis and justification for the perpetuation of old class relations. Since an open political fight was still impossible, the struggle
against the feudal oligarchy had to be conducted in a veiled form,
as an attack on religion. This was the task of the group of young
intellectuals of 1840 among whom Marx grew up and rose to a leading
position.
While still a student Marx admitted, although reluctantly, the
force of the Hegelian method of thought, dialectics, and made it his
own. That he chose for his doctor's thesis the comparison of the two
great materialistic philosophers of ancient Greece, Democritus and
Epicurus, seems to indicate, however, that in the deep recesses of subconsciousness Marx inclined to materialism. Shortly thereafter he
was called upon to assume the editorship of a new paper founded by
the oppositional Rheinish bourgeoisie in Cologne. Here he was drawn
into the practical problems of the political and social struggle. So
well did he conduct the fight that after a year of publication the paper
was banned by the State authorities. It was during this period that

Fmgi~bch made his final step towards materialism. Feuerbach
b m h d sway Hegel's fantastic system, turned towards the simple
experiences of everyday life, and arrived at the conclusion that religion was a man-made produet. Forty years later Engels still spoke
fervently of the liberating effect that Feuerbach's work had on his
contemporaries, and of the enthusiasm it aroused in Marx, despite
critical reservations. To Marx it meant that now instead of attacking
a heavenly image they had to come to grips with earthly realities.
Thus in 1843 in his essay "Kritikikder Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie"
("A Criticism of the Hegelian Philosophy of Law") he wrote r
"As far as Germany is concerned the criticism bf religion is patid l y completed; and the criticism of religion is the basis of all criticism.
The m a l e against religion is indirectly the s h g g l e
against th'at world whose spiritual amma is religion.
Religion is
the moan of the oppressed creature, the sentiment of a heartless
world, as it is'the spirit of spiritless c o n d i t i ~ .It is the opium of
the people. The abolition of religion as the illusory happiness of the
people is the demand for their real happiness, the demand to abandon
the illusions about their condition is a demand to abandon a condition
which requires illusions. The criticism of religion therefore contains
potmth11y the criticism.of the Vale of Team whose aureole is religion.
Criticism has plucked the imaginary flowers which adorned the chain,
not that man shbuld w a r his fetters denuded of fancifd embellishment, but that he should throw off the chain and break the living
Thus the criticism of heaven is transformed into the critiflower.
cism of earth, the kriZ;fcism of religion into the criticism of Law, and.
the criticim of theology into the criticism of pblitic~.~

...

.. .

.. .

The task confronting Marx was to investigate the realities of social
life. In eoIlaboration with- Engels during their stay in Paris and
Brussels, he made a study of the French Revolution and French socialism,as well as of English economy and the English working-class movement, which led towards further elaboration of the doctrine known
as "Historial Materialism". As the theory of social. development by
way of class struggles we find it expounded in "La midre de la philosophie" (written in 1846 against Proudhon's "Philosophie de la
mis6re"), in "The Communist Manifesto" (1848), and in the oftquoted Preface to "Zur Kritik der Politischen Oekonomie" (1859).
Marx and Engels themselves refer to this system of thought as
materialism, in opposition to the "idealism" of Hegel and the Young
Hegelians. What do they understand by materialism 9 Engel, discussing afterwards the fundamental theoretical problems of Historical
Materialism in his "Anti-Duhring" and in his booklet on Feuerbach,
states in the latter publication:

"The great basic question' of all philosophy, especially of modem philosophy, is that concerning the relation of thinking and being.
Those who asserted the primwy bf the spirit to nature and, therefore,
in the last instance, assumed world-creation in some form or. other,
comprised the camp of idealism. The others, who regarded nature as
primary, belong to the varioua schools of materia1ism."

...

That not only the human mind is bound up with the material organ
of the brain, but that, also, man with his brain and mind is intimately
connected with the rest of the animal kingdom and the inorganic
world, was a selfLevident truth to Marx and Engels. This conception
is common to all "schooIs of materialism." What distinguishes Marxist
materialism from other schools must be learned from its various
polemic works dealing with practical questions of politics and society.
Then we find that to Marx materialistic thought was a working
method. I t was meant to explain all phenomena by means of the material world, the existing realities. In his writings he does not deal with
philosophy, nor does he formulate materialism in a system of philosophy; he is utilizing it as a method for the study of the world, and
thus demonstrates its validity. In the essay quoted above, for example,
Marx does not demolish the Hegelian philosophy of Law by philosophical disputations, but through an annihilating criticism of the real
conditions in Germany.
In the materialist method philosophical sophistry and disputations
around abstract concepts are replaced by the study of the real world.
Let us take a few examples to elucidate this point. The statement
"Man proposes, God disposes" is interpreted by the theologian from
the point of view of the omnipotence of God. The materialist searches
for the cause of the discrepancy between expectations and results,
and finds it in the social effects of commodity exchange and competition. The politician debates the desirability of freedom and of socialism ; the materialkt asks : from what individuals or classes do these
demands spring, what specific content do they have, and to what
social need to they correspondl The philosopher, in abstract speculations about the essence of time, seeks to - establish whether or not
absolute time exiEits. The materialist compares cloeb to see whether
simultaneousness or succession of two phenomena can be established
unmistakably.
Feuerbach had preceded Marx in using the materialist method,
insofar as he pointed out that religious concepts and ideas are derived
from material conditions. He saw in living man the source of all
religious thoughts and concepts. "Der Mensch kt was er isst" (Man
is what he eats) is a well-known German pun summarizing his doctrine. Whether his materialism would be valid, however, depended
on whether he would be suceessfd in presenting a clear and convine-

ing explanation of religion. A materialism that leaves the problem
obscure is insufficient and will fall back into idealism. Marx pointed
out that the mere principle of taking living man as the starting point
is not enough. I n his theses on Feuerbach in 1845 he formulated the
essential difference between his materialistic method and Feuerbach 's
as3 follows :
"Feuerbach res'olves the religious essence into the human essence
(das menschliche Wesen). But the human essence is no abstraction
inherent in each single individual. In its reality it is the ensemble of
the social relationships" (Thesis 6). "His work consists in the dissolution of the religious world into its secular basis. The fact, however,
that the secular foundation lifts itself above itself and establishes
itself in the clouds as an independent realm is only to be explained
by the self-cleavage and self-contradictions of this secular basis. The
latter itself, therefore, must first be understood in its contradictions,
and then, by the removal of the contradiction, must be revolutionized
in practice" (Thesis 4).

I n short, man can be understood only ss a social being. From the
individual we must proceed to society, and then the social contradictions out of which religion came forth, must be dissolved. The real
world, the material, sensual world, where all ideology and consciousness have their origin, is the developing humah society-with nature
in the background, of course, as the basis on which society rests and
of which it is a part transformed by man.
A presentation of these ideas may be found in the manuscript of
''Die Deutsche Ideologie " (The German Ideology), written in 1845
but not published. The part that deals with Feuerbach was first published in 1925 by Rjazanov, then chief of the Marx-Engels Institute
in Moscow; the complete work was not published until 1932. Here
the theses on Feuerbach are worked out a t greater length. Although
it is manifest that Manr wrote it down quite hurriedly, he nevertheless
gave a brilliant presentation of all the essential ideas concerning the
evolution of society, which later found their short expression, practically, in the proletarian propaganda pamphlet, "The Communist
-Manifesto7' and, theoretically, in the preface to "Zur Kritik der Politischen Oekonomie " (" Critique of Political Economy '7.
"The German Ideology" is directed first of all against the dominant theoretical view which regarded consciousnesq as the creator, and
ideas developing from ideas as the determining factors of human history. They are treated here contemptuously as "the phantoms formed
in the human brain" that are "necessary sublimates of their material,
empirically verifiable life process bound to material premises." I t
was essential to put emphasis on the real world, the material and empirically-given world as the source of all ideology. But it was also neces-

sary to criticize the materialist theories that culminated in Feuerbach.
As a protest against ideology, the return to biological man and his
principal needs is correct; but it is not possible to find a solution to
the question of how and why religious ideas originate if we take the
individual as an abstract isolated being. Human society in its historical evolution is the dominant reality controlling human life. Only
out of society can the spiritual life of man. be explained. Feuerbach,
in his attempt to find an explanation of religion by a return to the
"real" man did not find the real man, because he searches for him
in the individual, the human being generally. From his approach the
world of ideas cannot be explained. Thus he was forced to fall back
on the ideology of universal human love. "Insofar as Feuerbach is
a materialist," Marx said, "he does not deal with history, and insofar
as he considers history, he is not a materialist."
What Feuerbach could not accomplish was accomplished by the
Historical Materialism of Marx: an explanation of man's id&s out
of the material world. A brilliant survey of the historical development
of society finds its philosophical summary in the sentence : "Men,
developing their material production and their material intercourse,
along with this, their real existence, alter their thinking and the products of their thinking. " Thus, as relation between reality and thinking? materialism is in practice proven to be right. We know reality
only through the medium of the senses. Philosophy, as theory of
knowledge, then finds its basis in this principle: the material, empirically given world is the reality which determines thought.
The basic problem in the theory of knowledge (epistemology) was
always: what truth can be attributed to thinking. The term "criticism of knowledge " (Erkenntniskritik) used by professional philosophers for this theory of knowledge, already implies a viewpoint of
doubt. In his second and fifth theses on Feuerbach Marx refers to
this problem and again points to the practical activity of man as the
essential content of his life :
"The question whether objective truth can be attributed to human

thinking is nbt a question of theory but a practical question. In practice man must prove the truth, i.e. the reality and power, the thissidedness of his thinkingn (Thesis 2). "Feuerbach, not satisfied with
abstract thinking, appeals to sensuous perception (Anschauung), but
he does not conceive sensuousness (die Sinnlichkeit) as a practical
human-sensuous activity" (Thesis 5).

Why practical l Because man in the first place must live. His
bodily structure, his faculties and his abilities, and all his activity
are adapted to this very end. With these he must assert himself in
the external world, i.e. in nature, and as an individual in society. To
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them abilitieg belongs the activity of the organ of thought, the brain,

and the facdty of thinking itself. Thinking is a bodily faculty. In
every phase of life man uses his power of thought to drsw conclnsions
from his experiences, on which expectations and hopes are built, and
these conclusions regulate his behavior and his actions. The correctness of his conclusions, the truth of his thinking, is shown by the very
fact of his existence, since it is a condition for his survival. Because
thinking is an efficient adaptation to life, it embodies truth, not for
every conclusion, but in its general character. On the basis of his
experiences man derives generalizations and rules, natural laws, on
which his expectations are based. They are generally correct, as is
witnessed by his survival. Sometimes, however, false conelusions may
be drawn, with failure and destruction in their wake. M e is a cont i n u o ~process of learning, adaptation, development. Practice is the
unsparing test of the correitnea~of thinking.
Let us first consider this in relation to natural science. In the
practice of this science, thought finds its purest and most abstract
form. This is why philosophical scientists take this form as the subject of their deductions and pay little attention to its similarity to
the thinking of everybody in his everyday activity. Yet thinking in
.the study of nature is only a highly developed special field in the
entire soc;ial labor process. 'Thislabor process demands an accurate
knowledge of natural phenomena and its integration into "laws of
nature," in order to utili~ethem successfully in the field of technics.
The determination of these laws through observation of special phenomena is the task of specialists. In the study of nature it is generally
accepted that practice, experiment, is the test of truth. Here, too, we
find that the observed regularities, formulated as laws of nature, are
generally fairly dependable guides to human practice; though they
are frequently not entirely correct and often balk expectation, they
ape improved constantly through the progress of science. If, therefore,
man at times was referred to as the "legislator of nature" it must
be added that nature often disregards his laws and summons him to
make better ones.
The practice of life, however, comprises much more than the scientific study of nature. The relation of the scientist to the world, despite
his experiments, remains observational. To him the world is an external thing to look at. But in reality man deals with nature in his
practical life by acting upon it and making it part of his existence.
Man does not stand against nature as to sn external alien world. By
the toil of his hands man transforms the world, to such an extent that
the original natural substance is hardly discernible, and in this process
transforms himself too. Thus man himself builds his new world:
human society, imbedded in nature transformed into a technical appa-

ratus. Man is the creator of this world. What meaning, then, has
the question of whether his thinking embodies truth9 The object of
his thinking is what he himself produces by his phygical and mental
activities, and which he controls through his brain.
: This is not a question of partial tmfhs. Engels in his booklet on
Feuerbach referred to the synthesking of tlse natural dye alizarin
(contained in madder) arrc. a proof of the tmth of human thinking.
This, however, proves only the validity of the chemical formula employed; it cannot prove the validity of materialism as-against Kant's
"Thing-in-itself." This concept, as may be seen from Kant's preface
to his - "Criticism of Pure Reason, " results from the incapacity of
bourgeois philosophy to understand the earthly origin of moral law.
The "Thing-in-itself" is not refuted by chemical industry but by
Historical Materialism explaining moral l ~ w
through society. It was
Historical Materialism that enabled Engels to see the fallacy of Kant's
philosophy, to prove the fallacionwess for which he then offered other
arguments. Thus, to repeat, it k not a question of partial truths in
a specific field of knowledge, where the practical outcome affirms
or refutes them. The point in question is a philosophical one, namely,
whether human thought is eapa%le of grasping the deepest truth of
the world. That the philosopher in his secluded study,' who handles
exclusively abstract philosophical concepts, which are derived in turn
from ab$tract scientific concepts themselves formulated outside of
practical life-that he, in the midst of this world of shadows? should
have his doubts, is easily understood. But for human beings, who live
and act in the practical every-day world, the question cannot have
any meaning. The truth of thought, says M a n , is nothing but the
power and mastery over the real world.
Of course this statement implies its counterpart: thinking cannot
embody truth where the human mind does not master the world. When
the products of man's hand-as Marx expounded in "Das Kapita17grow into a power over him, which he no longer controls and which
in the form of commodity-exchange and capital confronts him as an
independent social being, mastering man and even threatening to
destroy him, then his mind submits to the mysticism of supernatural
beings and he doubts the ability of his thinking to distinguish truth.
Thus in the course of past centuries the myth of supernatural heavenly
truth owa able to man overshadowed the 1118terialistic practice of
, daily experiences. Not until society has evolved to a state where man
will be able to comprehend all social forces and will have learned to
master them-in
communist' society, in short-will his thinking entirely correspond to the world. But already before, when the nature of
s o d production as a fundamental basis of life and future development has become clear to man, when the mind-be it only theoretically
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a t firet-actnally masters the world, our t h i n h g will be f d y true.
That mems that by the science of society as formulated by Marx,
becsuse now his thesis is fulfilled, materialism gains permanent mastery and becomes the only conformable philosophy. Thus Marxian
theory of society in principle means a transformation of philosophy.
Marx, however, was not concerned with pure philosophy. ''Philosophers have interpreted the world differently, but what matters is to
change it," he says in his last thesis on Feuerbach. The world situation pressed for practical action. . At first inspired by the rieing bourgeois opposition to absolutism, then strengthened by the new forces
that emanated from the struggle of the English and French working
class against the bourgeoisie, Marx and Engels, through their study
of social realities, arrived a t the conclusion that theeproletarian revolution following on the heels of the bourgois revolution would bring the
final liberation of mankind. From now onward their activity was
devoted to this revolution, and in "The Communist Manifesto" they
laid down the first directions for the workers' class struggle.
Marxism has since been inseparably connected with the class fight
of the proletariat. If we ask what Marxism is, we must first of all
nnderstand that it does not encompass everything Marx ever thought
and wrote. The views of his earlier years, for instance, such as quoted
above, are representative only in part; they are phases in a development leading toward Marxism. Neither was it complete a t once;
whereas the role-of the proletarian class struggle and the aim of communism is already outlined in "The Communist ~anifisto,."the theory
of capitalism and surplus value is developed much later. Moreover,
Marx's ideas themselves developed with the change of social and political conditions. The character of the revolution and the part played
by the State in 1848, when the proletariat had only begun to appear,
differed in aspect from that of later years a t the end of the century,
or to-day. Essential, however, are Marx's new contributions to science.
There is first of all the doctrine of Historical Materialism, the theory
of the determination of all political and ideological phenomena, of
spiritual life in general, by the productive forces and relations. The
system of production, itself based on the state of productive forces,
determines the development of society, especially through the force
of the class struggle. There is, furthermore, the presentation of capitalism as a temporary historical phenomenon, the analysis of its structure by the theory of value and surplus value, and the explanation
of .its revolutionary tendencies through the proletarian revolution
towards communism. With these theories Marx has enriched human
knowledge permanently. They constitute the solid foundation of
Marxism as a system of thought. From them further conclusions may
be drawn under new and changed circumstances.

1

Because of this scientific basis, however, Marxism is more than a
mere science. It is a new way of looking a t the past and the future,
a t the meaning of life, of the world, of thought; it is a spiritual revolution, it is a new world-view, a new life-system. Bs a system of life
Marxism is real and living only through the class that adheres to it.
The workers who are imbued with this new outlook, become aware of
themselves as the class of the future, wowing in number and strength
and consoiousness, striving to take production into their own hands,
and through the revolution to become masters of their own fate.
Hence Marxism as the theory of proletarian revolution is a reality,
and a t the same time a living power, only in the minds and hearts of
the revolutionary working class.
Thus Marxism is not an inflexible doctrine or a sterile dogma of
imposed truths. Society changes, the proletariat grows, science develops. New forms and phenomena arise in capitalism, in politics, in
science, which Marx and Engels could not have foreseen or s d e d .
Forms of thought and struggle, that under former conditions were
necessary must under later conditions give way to other ones. But
the method of research which they framed remaim up to this day an
excellent guide and tool towards the understanding and interpretation
of new events. The working class, enormously increased under capitalism, to-day stands only a t the threshold of its revolution and, hence,
of its Marxist development; Marxism only now begins to get its full
significance as a living force in the working class. Thus Marxism
itself is a living theory which grows with the increase of the proletariat
and with the tasks and aims of its fight.

MIDDLE-CLASS MATERIALISM
Returning now to the political scene out of which Marxism emerged,
it must be noted that the German revolution of 1848 did not bring
full political power to the bourgeoisie. But after 1850 capitalism
developed strongly in France and Germany. I n Prussia the Progressive Party began its fight for parliamentarism, whose inner weakness
became evident later when the government through military actions
met the demands of the bourgeoisie for a strong national. State. Movements for national unity dominated the political scene of Central
Europe. Everywhere, with the exception of England where it already
held power, the rising bourgeoisie struggled against the feudal absolutist conditions.

. The struggle of a new class for power in State and society is at
tb9 m e time always a spiritual struggle for a new world view. The
piwere csn be defeated only when the masses rise up against them
or, at least, do not follow them any longer. Therefore it was newwary
for the bourgeoisie to make the working masserr its followers and win
their adherence to capitaht society. For this purpow the old ideas!
of the petty bourgeokie and the peasants had to be destroyed and:
supplanted with new bourgeois ideologies. Capitalism itself furnished 2
the meam to this end.
The natural scienkes are .the spiritual basis of capitalism. On t h e 8
development of thew sciences3 depends the technical progress that " drives capitalism forward. Science, therefore, was.held in high esteem
by the rising bourgeois clam. At the same time this wience freed them
from the conventional dogmas embodying the rule- of feudalism. A
new outlook on life and on the world sprang up out of the scientific
discoveries, and supplied the bourgeoisie with the necessary argumenh
to defy the pretensions of the old powers. This new world outlook it
h e a t e d among the masses. To the peasant farm and the artisan
workshop belongq the inherited biblid faith. But as soon as the sons
of the peasants or the impoverished artisans become industrial workers
their mind b captured by cspitalist development. Even those who
remain in pre-capitalistic conditions are lured by the more liberal outlook of capitalist prop- and become swceptible to the.propaganda
of new idam
The spiritual fikht wes primarily a struggle against religion. The
religious creed is the ideology of past wnditiom'; it is the inherited
tradition which keeps the masses in submission to the old powers and
which had to be defeated. The struggle against religion was imposed
by the conditions of society; hence it had to take on varying form
with varying conditions. In those countries where the bourgeoisie had
already attained full power, as for instance in England, the struggle
was no longer necessary and the bourgeoisie paid homage to the established church. Only among the lower middle claas and among the
workers did more radid trends of thought find some adherence. In
countries where industry &d the bourgeoisie had to fight for emancipation they proclaimed a liberal, ethical Christianity in opposition to
the orthodox faith. And where the gtruggle against a still powerful
royal and aristocratic class waa difficult, and required the utmost
strength and exertion, the new world view had to assume extreme
forms of radicalism and gave rim to middle-class materiz$ism. This
was so to a great extent in Central Europe; so it is natural that most
of the popular propaganda for materialism (Moleschott, Vogt, Buechner), originated here, though it found an echo in other countries. In
addition to these radical pamphleb, a rich literature popularizing the

modem scientific discoveries appeared, supplying valuable Weapons
in the struggle to free the msases of the citizens, the workers, and the
peasants, from the spiritual fetters of tradition, and to turn them
followers of the progressive bourgeoisie. The middle-class intelligentsia-professors, engineers, doctore- were the moet zealous propagandists of the new enlightenment.
The essence of natural science was the discovery of laws operating
in nature. A careful study of natural phenomena disclosed recurring
regularities which allowed for scientific predictions. The 17th century had already known the Galilean law of falling bodies and gravity, Kepler's laws of the planetary motions, Sneu's law of the refraction of light, and Boyle's law of the gas pressure. Towards the end
of the century came the discovery of the law of gravitation by Newton, which more than all preceding discoveries exerted a tremendous
influence in the philosophical thought of the 18th and 19th centuries.
Whereas the others were rules that were not absolutely correct, Newton's law of gravitation proved to be the first real exact law strictly
dominating the motions of the heavenly bodies, which made possible
predictions of the phenomena with the same precision with which they
could be observed. From this the conception developed that all natural
phenomena follow entirely rigid definite laws. In nature causality
rules: gravity is the came of bodies falling, gravitation causes the
movements of the planets. All occurring phenomena are effects totally
determined by their causes, allowing for neither free will, nor chance
nor caprice.
This fixed order of n a m e disclosed by science was in direct contrast to the traditional religious doctrines in which Ctod as a despotic
sovereign arbitrarily rules the world and deals out fortune and misfortune as he sees fit, strikes his enemies with thunderbolts and pestilence and rewards others with miracles. Miracles are contradictory to
the fixed order of nature; miracles are impossible, and all reports
about them in the Bible are fables. The biblical and religious interpretations of nature belong to an epoch in which primitive agriculture
prevailed under the overlordship of absolute despots. The natural
philosophy of the rising bourgeoisie, with its natural laws controlling
all phenomena, belongs to a new order of state and society where the
arbitrary rule of the despot is replaced by laws valid for all.
The natural philosophy of the Bible, which theology asserts to be
absolute, tlivine, truth is the natural philosophy of ignorance that has
been deceived by outward appearances, that saw an immovable earth
. as the centre of the universe, and held that all matter was created and
was perishable. Scientific experience showed, on the contrary, that
matter which apparently disappeared (as for instance in burning)
actually changes into invisible gaseous forms. Scales demonstrated

,

that a reduction of the total weight did not occur in this process and
that, therefore, no matter disappeared. This discovery was generalized
into a new principle: matter cannot be destroyed, its quantity always
remaim? constant, only its forms and combinations change. This holds
good for each chemical element; its atoms constitute the building
stones of all bodies. Thus science with its theory of the conservation
of matter, of the eternity of nature, opposed the theological dogma of
the creation of the world some 6000 years ago.
Matter is not the only persistent substance science discovered in
the transient phenomena. Since the middle of the 19th century the
law known as the conservation of energy came to be regarded as the
fundamental axiom of physics. Here, too, a fixed and far reaching
order of nature was observed; in all phenomena changes of the form
of energy take place :heat and motion, tension and attraction, electrical
and chemical energy; but the total quantity never changes. Thia
principle led to an understanding of the development of cosmic bodies,
the sun and the earth, in the light of which all the assertions of theo.
logy appeared like the talk of a stuttering child.
Of even greater consequence were the scientific discovekies concerning man's place in the world. Darwin's theory of the origin of
species, which showed the evolution of man from the animal kingdom,
was in complete contradiction to all religions doctrines. But even
before Darwin, discoveries in biology and chemistry revealed the
organic identity of all human and living creatures with non-organic
nature. The protoplasm, the albuminous substance of which the cells
of all living beings are composed and to which all life is bound, consists of the same atoms as all other matter. The human mind, which
was elevated into a part of divinity by the theological doctrine of the
immortal sod, is closely bound up with the physical properties of the
brain; all spiritual phenomena are the accompaniment to or the effect
of material occurrences in the brain cells.
Middle-class materialism drew the most radical conclusiops from
these scientific discoveries. Everything spiritual is merely the product
of material processes; ideas are the secretion of the brain, just as bile
is the secretion of the liver. Let religion--said Buechner-go on talking about the fugacity of matter and the immortality of the mind;
in reality it is the other way around. With the least injury of the
brain everything spiritual disappears ; nothing at a11 remains of the
mind when the brain is destroyed, whereas the matter, its carrier, is
eternal and indeatmetible. All phenomena of life, including human
ideas, have their origin in the chemical and physical processes of the
cellular mbstance ; they differ from non-living matter only in their
greater complexity. Ultimately all their processes must be explained
by the dynamics and movements of the atoms.

These conclusions of natural-science materialism, however, could
not be upheld to their utmost consequences. After all, ideas are different from bile and similar bodily secretions; mind cannot be considered as a form of force or energy, and belongs in a quite different
category. If mind is a product of the brain which differs from other
,
fundamentally,
tissues and cells only in degree of c o m p l ~ t y then,
it must be concluded that something of mind, some sensation, is to be
found in every animal cell. And because the cellular substance is only
a n aggregate of atoms, more complex but in substance not different
from other matter, the conclusion must be that something of what
we call mind is already present in the atom : in every smallest particle
of matter there must be a particle of the "spiritual substance. " his'
theory of the "atom-soul" we find in the works of the prominent
zoologist Ernst Haeckel, energetic propagandist of Darwinism and
courageous combatter of religious dogmatism. Haeckel did not consider his philosophical views as materialism but called them monism
--strangely enough since he extends the duality of mind-matter down
to the smallest elements of the world.
Materialism could dominate the ideology of the bourgeois class
only for a short time. Only so long as the bourgeoisie could believe
that its society of private property, personal liberty, and free competition, through the development of industry, science and technique,
could solve the life problems of all mankind--only so long could the
bourgeoisie assume that the theoretical problems could be solved by
science, without the need to assume supernatural and spiritual powers.
As soon, however, as it became evident that capitalism could not solve
the life problems of the masses, as was shown by the rise of the proletarian class stmggle, the confident materialist philosophy disappeared.
The world was seen again full of insoluble contradictions and uncertainties, full of sinister forces threatening civilization. So the bourgeoisie turned to various kinds of religious creeds, and the bourgeois
intellectuals and scientists submitted to the influence of mystical tendencies. Before long they were quick to discover the weaknesses and
shortcomings of materialist philosophy, and to make speeches on the
"limitations of science" and the insoluble "world-riddles."
Only a small number of the more radical members of the lower and
middle classes, who clung to the old political slogans of early capitalipm, continued to hold materialism in respect. Among the working
class it found a fertile ground. The adherents of anarchism always
were its most convinced followers. Socialist workers embraced the
social doctrines of Marx and the materialism of natural science with
equal interest. The practice of labor under capitalism, their daily
experience and their awakening understanding of social forces contributed greatly towards undermining traditional religion. Then, to

solve their donbte, the need for scientific knowledge grew, and the
'1~1orbrsbeoame the most zealous readers of the works of Buechner

and HaeckeL Whilst Marxist doctrine determined the practical, politied and social. ideology of the workers, a deeper understanding
asserted itself only gradually ; few became aware of the fact that
middle-class materialism had long since been outdated and surpassed by Historical Materialism. This, by the way, concurs with the
fact that the working-class movement had not yet reached beyond
capitalism, that in practice the class struggle only tended to secure
its place within capitalist society, a d that the democratic solutions
of the early middle-class movements were accepted as valid for the
working c l m also. The full comprehension of revolutionary Marxist
theory is possible only in comection with revolutionary practice.
Wherein, then, do middle-class materialism and Historical Materialism stand opposed to one another!
Both agree insofar as they are materialist philosophies, that is,
both recognize the primacy of the experienced material world; both
recognize that spiritual phenomena, sensation, consciousheaq ideas,
are derived from the former. They are opposite in that middle-class
materialism bases itself upon natural science, whereas Historical
Materialism is primarily the science of society. Bourgeois scientists
observe msn only as an object of nature, the highest of the animals,
determined by natural laws. For an explanation of man's life and
action, they have only general biological laws and, in a wider sense,
the laws of chemistry, phpics, and mechanics. With these means little
can be acoomplished in the way of understanding social phenomena
and ideas. Historical Materialism, on the other hand, lays bare the
specific evolutionary laws of human society and shows the interconnection between ideas and society.
The axiom of materialism that the spiritual is determined by the
material world, has therefore entirely.different meanings for the two
doctrines. For middle-class materialism it means that ideas' are products of the brain, are to be explained out of the structure and the
changes of the brain substance, 'finally out of the dynamics of the
atoms of the brain. For Historical Materialism, it means that the
ideas of man are determined by his social conditions; society is his
environment which acts upon him through his sense organs. This
postulates an entirely different kind of problem, a different approach,
a different line of thought, hence, also a different theory of knowledge.
For middle-class materialism the problem of the meaning of knowledge is a question of the relationship of spiritual phenomena to the
physico-chemical-biologicalphenomena of the brain matter. For Historical Materialism it is a question of the relationship of our thoughts
(

to the phenomena which we experience as the external world. Now man's position in society is not simply that of an observing being;
he is a dynamic force whioh reacts upon his environment and changes
it. Society is nature transformed through labor. To the scientist.
nature is the objectively given reality which he observes, which acts
on him through the medium of his senses. To him the external world
is the active and dynamic element, whilst the mind is the receptive
element. Thus it is emphasized that the mind is only a reflection, an
image of the external world, as Engels expressed it. when he pointed
out the contradiction between the materialist and idealist philosophies.
But the science of the scientist is only part of the whole of human
activity, only a means to a greater end. It is the preceding, passive
part of his activity which i s followed by the active part: the technical
elaboration, the 'production, the transformation of the world by man.
Man is in the first place an active being. In the labor process he
utilizes his organs and aptitudes in order to constantly build and
remake his environment. In this procedure he not only invented the
artificial organs we call tools, but also trained his physical and mental
aptitudes so that they might react effectively to his natural environment as instruments in the preservation of life. His main organ is
the brain whose function, thinking, is as good a physical activity as
any other. The most important product of brain activity, of the
efficient action of the mind upon the world, is science, which stands
as a mental tool next to the material tools and, itself a productive
power, constitutes the basis of technology and so an essential part of
the productive apparatus.
Hence Historical Materialism looks upon the works of science, the
conoepts, substances, natural laws, and f ~rces,although formed out
of the stuff of nature, primarily as the creations of the mental labor
of man. ~iddle-class'materialism, on the other hand, from the point
of view of the scientific investigator, sees all this as an element of
nature itself which has been discovered and brought to light by science.
Natural scientists consider the immutable substances, matter, energy,
electricity, gravity, the law of entropy, etc., as the basic elements of
the world, as the reality that has to be discovered. From the viewpoint
of Historical Materialism they are products which creative mental
activity forms out of the substance of natural phenomena.
This is one fundamental difference in the method of thinking.
Another difference lies in dialectics which Historical Materialism
inherited from Hegel. Engels has pointed out that the materialist
philosophy of the 18th century disregarded evolution; it is evolution
that makes dialectic thinking indispensable. Evolution and dialectics
since have often been regarded as synonymous; and the dialectic
character of Historical 'Materialism is supposed to be rendered by

saying that it is the theory of evolution. Evolution, however, was
well known in the natural science of the 19th century. Scientists were
well acquainted with the growth of the cell into a complex organism,
with the evolution of animal species as expressed in D a r h i s m , and
with the theory of evolution of the physical world known as the law
of entropy. Yet their method of reasoning was nndialectic. They
believed the concepts they handled to be fixed objects, and considered
their identities and opposites as absolutes. So the evolution of the
world as well as the progress of science brought out contradictions,
of which many examples have been quoted by Engels in his "AntiDiihring. " Understanding in general and science in particular segregate and systematize into fixed concepts and rigid laws what in the
real world of phenomena occurs in all degrees of flux and transition.
Because language separates and defines groups of phenomena by
means of names, all items falling into a group, as specimens of the
concept, are considered similar and unchangeable. As abstract concepts, they differ sharply, whereas in reality they transform and
merge into one another. The colors blue and green are distinct from
each other but in the intermediary nuances no one can say where
one color ends and the other begins. It cannot be stated at what point
during its life-cycle a flower begins or ceases to be a flower. That
in practical life good and evil. are not absolute opposites is acknowledged everyday, just as that extreme justice may become extreme
injustice. Juridical freedom in capitalist development manifests itself
as actual slavery. Dialectic thinking is adequate to reality in that
in handling the concepts it ia aware that the finite cannot fully render
the infinite, nor the static the dynamic, and that every concept has
to develop into new concepts, even into its opposite. Metaphysical,
undialectical thinking, on the other hand, leads $0 dogmatic assertions
and contradictions because it views conceptions formulated by thought
as fixed, independent entities that make up the reality of the world.
Natural science proper, surely, does not suffer much from this
shortcoming. It surmounts difficulties and contradictions in practice
insofar as continually it revises its formulations, increase their richness by going into finer details, improves the qualitative distinctions
by mathematical formulas, completes them by additions and corrections, thereby bringing the picture ever closer to the original, the
world of phenomena. The lack of dialectic reasoning becomes disturbing only when the scientist passes from his special field of knowledge towards general philosophical reasonings, as is the case with
middle-class materialism.
Thus, for instance, the theory of the origin of species often leads
to the notion that the human mind, having evolved from the animal
mind, is qualitatively identical with the latter and has only increased

in quantity. On the other hand, the qualitative difference between
the human and the animal mind, a fact of common experience, was
raised by theological doctrine, in enunciating the immortality of the
soul, into an absolute antithesis. I n both cases there is a lack of
dialectic thinking according to which a similarity in original character,
when through the process of g~owth the increasing quantitative
difference turns into qualitative difference-the so-called inversion
of quantity into quality-requires new names and characteristics,
without leading to complete antithesis and loss of affinity.
It is the same metaphysical, non-dialectic thinking to compare
thought, because it is the product of brain processes with such products of other organs as bile; or to assome that mind, because it is
a quality of some material substance, must be a characteristic quality
of all matter. And especially, to think that because mind is something
other than matter, it must belong to an absolutely and totally different world without any transition, so that a dualism of mind and
matter, reaching down to the atoms, remains sharp and unbridgeable.
To dialectic thinking mind simply is a concept incorporating all those
phenomena we call spiritual, which, thus, cannot reach beyond their
actual appearance in the lowest living animals. There the term mind
becomes questionable, because the spiritual phenomena disappear
gradually into mere sensibility, into the more simple forms of life.
"Mind" as a characteristic existing quality, a separate something,
which either is or is not there, does not exist in nature; mind is just
a name we attach to a number of definite phenomena, some perceived
clearly, others uncertainly, as spiritual.
Life itself offers a close analogy. Proceeding from the smallest
microscopic organisms to still smaller invisible bacteria and viruses,
we finally come to highly complicated albuminous molecules that fall
within the sphere of chemistry. Where in this succession living matter
ceases to exist and dead matter begins cannot be determined; phenomena change gradually, become simplified, are still .analogous and
yet already different. This does not mean that we are unable to
ascertain demarcation lines; it is simply the fact that nature knows
of no boundaries. A condition or quality "life", which either is or
is not present, does not exist in nature; again life is a mere name,
a concept we form in order to comprehend the endless variety of
gradations in life phenomena. Because middle-class materialism deals
with life and death, matter and mind, as if they were genuine realities
existing in themselves, it is compelled to work with hard and sharp
opposites, whereas nature offers an immense variety of more or less
gradual transitions.
Thus the difference between middle-class materialism and Historical Materialism reaches down to basic philosophical views. The

f o m , in oontradiction' to the comprehensive and perfectly realistic

-rid
Materialism is illusionary and imperfectjust as the
b&mgeois class movement, of which it was the theory, represented
an imperfect and illusionary emancipation, in contrast to the complete
and reel emancipation by way of the proletarian class struggle.
The difference between the two systems of thought shows itself
practically in their position towards religion. Middle-class materialism intended to overcome religion. However, a certain view arisen
out of social life cannot be vanquished .and destroyed merely by
refuting it with argumentation; this means posing one point of view
against another; and every argnment finds a counter-argument. Only
when it is shown why, and under what circumstances such a view
was necessary, can it be defeated by establishing the transient character of these conditions. Thus the disproof of religion by natural
science was effective only insofar aa thk primitive religious beliefs
were concerned, where ignorance about natural laws, about thunder
and lightning, about matter and energy, led to all kinds of superstition. The theory of bonrgeois society was able to destroy the
ideologies of primitive agricultural economy. But religion in bourgeois society is anehored in its &own
and uncontrollable social
forces; middleclass materialism was unable to deal with them. Only
the theory of the workers' revolution can destroy the ideologies of
bourgeois economy. Historid. Materialism explains the social basis
of religion and shows why for certain times and classes it was a
necessary way of thought. Only thus was its spell broken. Historical Materialism does not fight religion directly; from its higher
vantage point it understands and explains religion as a natural phenomenon under definite conditions. But through this very insight
it undermines religion and foresees that with the rise of a new society
religion will disappear. I n the same way Historical Materialism is
able to explab the temporary appearance of materialist thought among
the bourgeoisi.e, as well as the relapae of this class into mysticism
and religious trends. In the same way, too, it explains the growth
of materialist thpught among the working class as being not due to
any antireligious argument but to the growing recognition of the
real forces in capitalist society.

DIETZGEN
Middle-cless materialism, when it came up in Western Europe
in connection with the fight of the middle class for emancipation, was
inevitable in practice; but as theory it was a retrogression compared
*with Historical Mkterialism. Marx and Engels were so far ahead
that they saw it only as a backsliding into obsolete ideas of the 18th
century enlightenment. Because they saw so very clearly the weaknesses of the bourgeois political fight in Germany-wbile underrating
the vitality of the capitalist system-they did not give much attention to the accompanying theory. Only occasionally they directed at
it some contemptuous words, to refute any identification of the two
kinds of materialism. During their entire lifetime their attention
was concentrated upon the antithesis of their theory to the idealist
systems of Geman philosophy, especially Hegel. Middle-class materialism, however, wai somewhat more than a mere repetition of 18th
century ideas; the enormous progress of the science of nature in the
19th century was its bask and was a source of vigor. A criticism of
quite different from those of
its foundations had to tackle
post-Hegelian philosophy. What was needed was a critical examination of the fundamental ideas and axioms which were universally
accepted as the resnlts of natural science and which were in part
accepted by Marx and Engels too.
Here lies the importance of the writings of Joseph Dietzgen.
Dietzgen, an artisan, a tanner living in Rhineland, who afterwards
went to America and there t-ook some part in the working class
movement, was a self-made socialist philosopher and author. In social
and economic matters he considered himself a pupil of Marx, whose
theory of value and capital. he entirely comprehended. In philosophy
he was an independent original thinker, who set forth the philosophical consequences of the new world view. Manr and Engels,
though they honorably mentioned him as "the philosopher of the
proletariat" did not agree with everything he wrote; they blamed
his repetitions, often judged him coafused, and it is doubtful whether
they ever understood the essence of his arguments, far removed from
their own mode of thinking. Indeed, whereas Marx expresses the
new truth of his views as precise statements and sharp logical armments, Diet~gensees his chief aim in stimulating his readers to think
far themselves on the problem of thinking. For this purpose he
repeats his arguments in many forms, exposes the reverse of what
he stated before, and assigm to every truth the limits of its truth,

fearing above all that the reader should accept any statement as
a dogma. Thus he teaches practical dialectics. Whereas in his later
writings he is often vague, his first work "The nature of human
brain work" (1869), and his later "A socialist's excursions into
the field of epistemology" (1877), as well as some smaller pamphlets,
are brilliant contributions to the theory of knowledge. They form
an essential part in the entirety of the world view that we denote by
the name of Marxism. The first problem in the science of human
knowledge : the origin of ideas, was answered by Marx in the demonstration that they are produced by the surrounding world. The second,
adjoining problem, how the impressions of the surrounding world are
transformed into ideas, was answered by Dietzgen. Marx stated what
realities determine thought; Dietzgen established the relation between reality and thought. Or, in the words of Herman Gorter, Marx
pointed out what the world does to the mind, Dietzgen pointed out
what the mind does itself.
Dietzgen proceeds from the experiences of daily life, and especially
from the practice of natural science. "Systematization is the essence,
is the general expression of all activity of science. Science seeks only
by our understanding to bring the objects of the world into order
and system." Human mind takes from a group of phenomena what
is common to them (e.g. from a rose, a cherry, a setting sun their
color), leaves out their specific diff erences, and fixes their general
character(red) in a concept; or it expresses as a rule what repeats
itself (e.g. stones fall to the earth). The object is concrete, the spiritual concept is abstract. "By means of our thinking we have,
potentially; the world twofold, outside as reality, inside, in our head,
as thoughts, as ideas, as an image. Our brains do not grasp the things
themselves but only their concept, their, general image. The endless
variety of things, the infinite wealth of their characters, finds no
room in our mind". For our practical life indeed, in order to foresee
events and make predictions, we do not want all- the special cases
but only the general rule. The antithesis of mind and matter, of
thought and reality, of spiritual and material, is the antithesis of
abstract and concrete, of general and special.
This, however, is not an absolute antithesis. The entire world,
the spiritual as well as the visible and tangible world, is object to
our thinking. Things spiritual do exist, they too are really existing,
as thoughts; thus they too are materials for our brain activity of
forming concepts. The spiritual phenomena are assembled in the
concept of mind. The spiritual and the material phenomena, mind
and matter together, constitute the entire real world, a coherent
entity in which, matter determines mind and mind, through human
activity, determines matter. That we call this total world a unity
24
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means that each part exists only as a part of the whole, is entirely
determined by the action of the whole, that, hence, its qualities and
its special character consists in its relations to the rest of the world.
Thus also mind, i.e. all things spiritual, is a part of the world's
totality, and its nature consists in the totality of its relations to the
world's whole, which we then, as the object of thinking, oppose to it
under the name material, outer, or real world. If now we call this
material world primary and the mind dependent, it means for Dietzgen.
simply that the entirew is primary and the part secondary. Such
a doctrine where spiritual and material things, entirely interdependent, form one united world, may rightly be called monism.
This distinction between the real world of phenomena and the
spiritual world of concepts produced by our thinking is especially
suitable to clear up the nature of scientific conceptions. Physics has
discovered that the phenomena of light can be explained by rapid
vibrations propagated through space, or, as the physicists said, through
space-fiIling ether. Dietzgen quotes a physicist stating that these
waves are the real nature of light whereas all that we see as light
and color is only an appearance. "The superstition of philosophical
speculation here" Dietzgen remarks "has led us astray from the path
of scientific induction, in that waves rushing through the ether with
a velocity of 40,000 (German) miles per second, and constituting
the true nature of light are opposed to the real phenomena of light
and color. The perversion becomes manifest where the visible world
is denoted as a product of the human mind, and the ether vibrations,
disclosed by the intellect of the most acute thinkers, as the corporeal
reality." It is quite the reverse, Dietzgen says: the colored world
of phenomena is the real world, and the *etherwaves are the picture
constructed by the human mind out of these phenomena.
I t is clear that in this antagonism we have to do with different
meanings about the terms truth and reality. The only test to decide
whether our thoughts are truth is always found in experiment,
practice, experience. The most direct of experiences is experience
itself; the experienced world of phenomena is the surest of all things,
the most indubitable reality. Surely we know phenomena that are
only appearances. This means that the evidences of different senses
are not in accordance and have to be fitted in a different way in
order to get a harmonious world-picture. Should we assume the
image behind the mirror, which we can see but cannot touch, as a
common reality, then such a confused knowledge would bring practical
failure. The idea that the entire world of phenomena should be
nothing but appearance could make sense only if we assumed another
source of know1edge-e.g. a divine voice speaking in us-to be brought
in harmony with the other experiences.

-

B
L
p
p
m
g now the same test of practice to the physicist we see
h t ,& thinking. is correct also. By means of his vibrating ether

he not o d y explained known phenomena but even predicted in the
right way a number of unsuspected new phenomena. So his theory
is a good, a true theory. It is truth because it expresses what is
common to all those experiences in a short fornula that allows of
easy deduction of their endless diversity. Thus the ether waves must
be considered a true picture of reality. The ether itself of course
cannot be observed in m y way; observation shows only phenomena
of light;
How is it then, that the physicists spoke of the ether and its
vibrations as a reality l Firstly as a model, conceived by analogy.
From experience we know of waves in water and in the air. If now
we aeenme such waves in another, finer s u b s ~ c filling
e
the universe,
we may transfer to. it a number of well-known wave-phenomena, and
we find these confirmed. So we find our world of reality growing
wider. With our spiritual eyes we see new substances, new particles
moping, inkisible because they are beyond the power of our best
microscopes, but conceivable after the model of our visible coarser
substa&es. and particles.
In this way, however, with ether as a new invisible reality, the
physichts landed into difficulties. The analogy was not perfect;
the world-filling ether had to be assigned qualities entirely different
from water or air; though called a subtance it deviated so completely
from an known substances that an Enklkh. physic%& once compared
it somehow to pitch. When it wa&&overed that light waves were
electromagnetic vibrations, it ensued that the ether had to t r a d f :
electric and magnetic phenomena too. For this role, a complicated
structure had to be devised, a system of moving, straining, and
spinning oontrivances, that might -be wed as a coarse model, but
which nobody would call the true reality of thia fin& of fluids
filling space between the atoms. The thing became worse when in
the beginning of the 20th century the theory of relativity came up
and denied the existence of ether altogether. Physicists :then grew
accustomed to deal with a void spscei, equipped however with qualities expressed in mathematical formulas and equations. With the
formulas the phenomena could be computed in the right way; the
mathematical symbole were the only thing remaining. The models
and images were nonessential, and the truth of a theory does not
mean anything more than that the f~rmulasare exwt.
Things became worse still when phenomena were discovered that
could be represent, only by light consisting of a stream of so-called
quanta, separated particla hurrying through space. At the same
time the theory of vibrations held the field too, so that according

to needs one theory or the other had to be applied. Thus two strictly
contradictory theories both were true, each to be used within its
p u p of phenomena. Now at last phpicists began to suspect that
their physical entities, formerly considered the reality behind the
phenomena, were only images, abstract concepts, models more easily
to comprehend the phenomena. When Ditzgen half a century before
wrote down his views which were simply a consequence of Historical
Materialism, there was no physicist who did not firmly believe in the
reality of world ether. The voice of a socialist artisan did not penetrate into the university lecture rooms. Nowadays it is precisely
the physicists who assert that they are dealing with models and
images only, who are continually discussing the philosophical basis
of their science, and who emphasige that science aims solely at relations
and formulas through which future phenomena may be predicted
from former ones.
In the word phenomenon, "that which appears". there is contained an oppositeness to the -reality of things ; if we speak of "appearings" there must be something else that appears. Not at all,
says Dietzgen; phenomena appear (or occur), that is all. In this
play of words we must not think, of course, of what appears to me
or to another observer; all that happens, whether man sees it or not,
is a phenomenon, and all these happenings form the totality of the
world, the real world of phenomena. "Sense perception shows an
endless transformation of matter. . . . The sensual world, the universe
at any place and any time is a new thing that did not exist before.
It arises and passes away, passes and arises under our hands. Nothing
remains the same, lasting is only perpetual change, and even the
change varies . . The (middle-class) materialist, surely, asserts the
permanency, eternity, indestructibility of matter . . . Where do we
find such eternal, imperishable formless matter? In the real world
of phenomena we meet only with forms of perishable matter . . . Eternal and imperishable matter exists practically, in reality, only as
the sum total of its perishable phenomena". I n short, matter is an
abstraction.
Whereas philosophers spoke of the essence of things, physicists
spoke of matter, the lasting background behind the changing phenomena. Reality, they say, is matter; the world is the totality of
matter. This matter consists of atoms, the invariable ultimate building stones of the universe, that by their various-combinations impose
the impression of endless change. On the model of surrounding hard
objects, as an extension of the visible world of stones, grains, and
d ~ t these
,
still smaller particles were assumed to be the constituents
of the entire world, of the fluid water as well as of the formless air.
The truth of the atomic theory has stood the test of a century of

.

experience, in a n endless number of good explanations and successful
predictio~m. Atoms of course are not observed phenomena themselves ;
they are inferences of our thinking. As such they share the nature
of
products of our thinking; their sharp limitation and distinction,
their precise equality belongs to their abstract character. As abstractions they express what is general and common in the phenomena,
what is necessary for predictions.
To the physicist, of course, atoms were no abstractions but real
small invisible particles, sharply limited, exactly alike for every
chemical element, with precise qualities and precise mass. But modern
science destroyed also this illusion. Atoms, firstly, have been dissolved
into still smaller particles, electrons, protons, neutrons, forming complicated systems, some of them inaccessible to any experiment, mere
products of the application of logic. And these smallest elements of
the world cannot be considered as precisely defined particles finding
themselves a t definite points in space. Modern physical theory assigns
to each of them the character of a wave motion extending over infinite
space. When you ask the psysicist what it is that moves in such
waves his answer consists in pointing to a mathematical equation.
The waves are no waves of matter, of course; that which moves
cannot even be called a substance, but is rendered most truly by the
concept of probability ; the electrons are probability-waves. Formerly
a particle of matter in its invariable weight presented a precisely
defined quantity, its mass. Now mass changes with the state of
motion and cannot be separated accurately from energy; energy and
mass change into one another. Whereas formerly these concepts
were neatly separated and the physical world was a clear system
without contradiction, proudly proclaimed the real world, physics
nowadays, when it assumes its fundamental concepts matter, mass,
energy as fixed, well separated entities, is plunged into a crowd of
unsolvable contradictions. The contradiction is cleared up when we
simply consider them as what they are : abstractions serviceable , t o
render the ever extending world of phenomena.
The same holds for the forces and laws of nature. Here Dietzgen's
expositions are not adequate and somewhat confused, probably because a t the time the German physicists used the word "Kraft"
indiscriminately for force and for energy. A simple practical case,
such as gravity, may easily clear u p the matter. Gravity, physicists
said, is the cause of falling. Here cause is not something preceding
the effects and different from it ; cause and eff wt are simultaneous
and express the same thing i n different words. Gravity is a name
that does not contain anything more than the phenomena themselves ;
in denoting them by this word we express the general, the common
character of all the phenomena of falling bodies. More essential

than the name is the law; in all free movements on earth there is a
constant downward acceleration. Writing the law as a mathematical
formula we are able to compute the motions of all fdling or thrown
bodies. It is not necessary now to keep the phenomena all in our
head; to know future cases it is sufficient to know the law, the
formula. The law is the abstract concept our mind constructed out
of the phenomena. As a law it is a precise statement that is assumed
to hold good absolutely and universally, whereas the phenomena are
diversified and always show deviations which we then ascribe to
other, accessory, causes.
Newton extended the law of gravity to the celestial motions. The
orbit of the moon was "explained" by showing that it was pulled
by the same force that made stones fall onto earth; so the unknown
was reduced to the known. His law of universal gravitation is expressed by a mathematical formula through which astronomers are
able to compute and predict the celestial phenomena; and the result
of countless predictions shows the truth of the law. Scientists now
called the gravitation the "cause" of all these motions; they saw
it as a reality floating in space, a kind of mysterious imp, a spiritual
being called a "force" directing the planets in their course; the law
was a command somehow present in nature which the bodies had to
obey. I n reality there is nothing of the sort; "cause" means the
short summary or compendium, "effect" means the diverse multitude
of phenomena. The formula binding the acceleration of each particle
to its distance from the other ones, expresses in a short form exactly
the same course of things as does a lengthy description of the actual
motions. Gravitation as a separate something pulling and steering
the bodies does not exist in nature but only in our head. As a mysterious command permeating space it has no more real existence
than has Snell's law of refraction as a command to the light rays on
how they have to go. The course of the light rays is a direct mathematical consequence of the different velocity of light in different
substances; instead of by the command of a law it can equally well be
represented by the principle that light, as it were an intelligent being,
chooses the quickest route t o reach the aim. Modern science, in an
analogous way, in the theory of relativity, renders the motions in space
not by gravitational force, but by prescribing the shortest road (the
"geodesic") in the distorted four-dimensional space-time. Now again
physicists came to consider this warped space as a "reality" behind
the phenomena. And again it must be stated that, like Newton's
gravitation, it is only a mental abstraction, a set of formulas, better
than the former, hence more true, because it represents more phenomena which the old law could not explain.
What is called "causality" in nature, the reign of natural laws
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one even speda of the "law of causality," i.e. in nature

& b h ?!t~&asl
~
that laws hold-imply
comes down to the fact that the
&ties we find in the phenomena are expressed in the form of
grescripts absolutely valid. If there are limitations, exceptions, conditions, they are expressly stated as such, and we try to-represent
them by correcting the law; this shows that its character is meant to
be absolute. We are eohfident that it holds for future me; and if it
fails, as often happens, or does not hold prechly, we represent this
by additional "canses."
.We often speak of the inexorable course of events, or of the necessity in nature; or we ape& of "determinism," as if this eonrse had
been determined and fkred by somebody in advame. All these hnman
names chosen to expmiw the antithesis to the arbitrapinem and free
choice in hnman actions, denoting a king of compdlsion, are a source
of much codmion and c~nnotrender exactly the character of nature.
M h e r we my that the entire nature at this moment. depends entirely
on what it wae a moment More. Or perhaps better still: that nature
in its totality and history is a unity, remaining i d e n t i d y itself in
all its variations.
parts are interrdafed es parts of one whole,
and the lam of nature are the humdy imperfect expressions of these
interrelations. Nec*
can be asmibed to them solely in a partial
imperfect degrm; absolute neoessity may be affirmed for the entirety
of nature only. Phenomena may be imperfectly rendered by our
lam; bat we are oonvinced that they go on in a way which can be
ultimately redneed to simple dwcription, and could not be otherwise
than they sre.
The significance of Marxism is often expressed by saying that it
presents, for the first time, a natural science of society. Hence society,
jnst ae natore, is determined by natural laws; society develops hot
by h c e or incidentally but acctording to an over-ail necessity. And
since miety ia hnman activity, then human action Bnd choice and
will are not mbitmry, not*t'ehanoe, but determined by social causes.
What this mearm'fl now be clear. The totality of the world, consisting of nature md society, i s a unity, at any moment determined by
what it waa before, eaoh part entirely determined by the action of the
rest. It r e m a the same identiaal world, in which the happenings
of one part, of m d d or part of it, depend entirely on the surrounding world, natnle snd society together. Here too we try to find re@larities, rules and laws, and we devise names &d concepts; but aeldom
do we a d b e to thetn a separate reality. Whereas a phpicist easily
believes in gravitation as a real something floating in space a m d
the wn and the planets, it is more difficult to believe in 'cpmgresdp
or "liberty" hovering round m and floating over society as real
beings thst conduct man like a ruling fate. They too are abstractions

constructed by the mind out of partial relations and dependea~i~s.
With their "necessity" it is 8s with all necessity in nature. Its basis
is the necessity that man must eat to live. In this popular saying the
fundamental connection of man with the entirety of the world is
expressed.
Through the immense complication of social relations "laws " of
society are much more difficult to discern, and they cannot now be
put into the form of exact formulas. Still more than in nature they
may be said to express not the future but our expectation about the
future. It is already a great thing that, whereas former thinkers were
groping in the dark, now some main lines of development have been
discovered. The importance of Marxism as a science of society is not
so much the truth of the rules and expectations it formulated, but
rather what is called its method: the fundamental conviction that
everything in the world of mankind is directly connected with the
rest. Hence for every social phenomenon we have to look for the
material and social factors of reality on which it depends.

MACH
In the later part of the 19th century, middle-class society turned
away more and more from materialism. The bourgeoisie, through
the development of capitalism, asserted its social mastery; but, the
rise of the working class movement proclaiming as its aim the annihilation of capitalism, led to misgivings as to the durability of the
existing social system. World and future appeared full of unsolvable
problems. Since the visible, material forces threatened mischief, the
d i n g class, to quiet its apprehensions and assure its self-reliance,
tnrned to the belief in the superior rule of spiritual powers. Mysticism and religion gained the upper hand, and still more so in the
20th century, after the first World War.
Natural scientists form a part of middle-class society; they are in
continual contact with the bourgeoisie and are influenced by its spiritual trends. At the same time, through the progress of science, they
have to deal with new problems and contradictions appearing in their
concepts. I t is not clear philosophical insight that inspires the criticism of their theories, but rather the immediate needs of their praa
tioal. study of nature. This criticism then takes its form and color
from the anti-materialist trends in the ruling class. Thus modern

n a t d philosophy exhibits two characters: critical reflection over
the principles of science, and a critical mood towards materialism.
Just as in the time of Hegel, valuable progress in the theory of
know,

ledge is garbed in mystical and idealistic forms.
Critics of the prevailing theories came forward, in the last part
of the 19th century, in different countries: e.g. Karl Pearson in England, Gustav Kirchhoff and Ernst Mach in Germany, Henri Poinear6
in France, all exhibiting, though in' different ways, the same general
trend of thought. Among them the writings of Mach have doubtless
exerted the greatest influence upon the ideas of the next generation.
Physics, he s s p , should not proceed from matter, from the atoms,
from the objects; these are all derived concepts. The only thing we
know directly is experience, and all experience consists in sensations,
sense impressions (Empfindungen). By means of our world of concepts, in consequence of education and intuitive custom, we express
every sensation as the action of an object upon ourselves as subject:
I see a stone. But freeing ourselves from this custom we perceive that
a sensation is a unit in itself, given directly without the distinc'tion
of subject and object. Through a number of similar sensations I come.
to the distinction of an object, and I know of myself too only by a
totality of such sensations. Since object and subject are built up of
sensations it is better not to use a name that points to a person experiencing them. So we prefer the neutral name of "elements, " as the
simplest basis of all knowledge.
Ordinary thinking here finds the paradox that the hard immutable stone, the prototype of the solid "thing" should be formed by,
should ''consist of " such transient subjective stuff as sensations. On
closer examination, however, we see that what constitutes the thing.
its qualities, are simply this and nothing else. First its hardness is
nothing but the totality of + number of often painful sensations; and
secondly its immutability is the sum total of our experiences that on
our returning to the same spot the same sensations repeat themselves.
So we expect them as a fixed interconnection in our sensations. In
our knowledge of the thing there is nothing that has not somehow the
character of a sensation. The object is the sum total of all sensations
at different times that, through a certain constancy of place and surroundings considered as related, are combined and denoted by a name.
I t is no more; there is no reason to assume with Kant a 'thing in
itself" (Ding an sich) beyond this sensation-mass; we cannot even
express in words what we would have to think of it. So the object is
formed entirely by sensations; it conskts merely of sensations. Mach
opposes his views to the current physical theory by the words:

"Not bodies produce sensatibns, but element-complexes (sensationcomplexes) cbnatitute the bodies. When the physicist considers the
bodies as the permanent reality, the "elements" as the transient
appearance, he does not realize that all "bodies" are only mental
symbols for element-complexes (sensation-complexes)" ("Analyse
der Empfindungen" p. 23).

The same holds for the subject. What we denote by "I myself"
& a complex of recollections and feelings, former and present sensations and thoughts connected by continuity of memory, bound to a
special body, but only partly permanent.

.. .

"What is primary is not myself but the elements.
The elements
constitute the myself.
The elements of consciousness of one per$on 'are strongly connected, those of different persons are only
weakly and passingly connected. Hence everybody thinks he knows .
only of himself as an -indivisible and independent unity" ( " A d y s e
der Empfindungen" p. 19).

...

I n his work "Die Mechanik in ihrer Entwicklnng" (1883) (The
Development of Mechanics) he writes along the same lines :
"Nature consists of the elements given by the senses. Primitive man
first takes out of them certain complexes of these elements that
present themselves with a certain stability and are most important
to him. The first and oldest words are names for "things.." Here
abstraction is made fr'om the surroundings, from the continual small
'changes of these complexes, which are not heeded because they are
not important. In nature there is no invariable thing. The thing is
an abstraction, the name is a symbol for a complex of elements of
which we neglect the changes. That we denote the entire complex
by one word, one symbbl, is done because we want to awaken a t once
, The sensations are no
all impressions that belong together.
"symbols of things." On the contrary the "thing" is a mental symbol
for a sensation-complex of relative stability. Not the things, the
bodies, but cblors, sounds, pressures, times (what we usually call
sensations) are the true elements of the world. The entire process has
an economical meaning. In picturing facts we begin with the ordinary more stable and habitual complexes, and afterwards for correction add what is unusual" (p. 464).

..

I n this treatment of the historical. development of the science of
mechanics he. comes close to the method of Historical Materialism.
To him the history of science is not a sequence of geniuses producing
marvelous discoveries. He shows how the practical problems are first
solved by the mental methods of common life, until a t last they acquire
their most simple and adequate theoretical expression. Ever again
the economic function of science is emphasized.
"The aim of all science is to substitute and to save experiences
through the picturing and the forecastings bf facts by thoughts,
because these pictures are more easily a t hand than the experiences

themselves and in many respects may stand for them" (p. 452).
"When we depict facts by thoughts we never imitate them exactly,
but only figure those siderr that are important for us; we have an
aim that directly or indirectly arose out of practical interests. Our
pictures are always abstractions. This again shows an economic
trendyy(p. 464).

Here we see science, specialized as well as common knowledge,
connected with the necessities of life, as an implement of existence.
"The biolbgical task of science is to offer a most perfect orientation
to man in the full possession of his senses" ("Analyse der Empfindungen" p. 29).

For man, in order to react efficiently to the impressions of his
surroundings in each situation, it is not necessary to remember dl
former cases of analogous situations with their results. He has only
to know what results generally, as a rule, and this determines his
actions. The rule, the abstract concept is the instrument ready a t
hand that saves the mental consideration of all former cases. What
natural law states is not what will happen and must happen in nature,
but what we expect will happen; and that is the very purpose they
have to serve.
The formation of abstract concepts, of rules and laws of nature,
in common life as well as in science, is an intuitive process, intended
- to save brain work, aiming at economy of thinking. Mach shows in
a number of examples in the history of science how every progress
consists in greater economy, in that a larger field of experiences is
compiled in a shorter way, so that i n the predictions a repetition of
the same brain operations is avoided. "With the short lifetime of
man and his limited memory, notable knowledge is only attainable
by the utmost economy of thinking." So the task-of science consists
in "representing facts as completely as possible by a minimum of
brainwork" ("Die Mechanik in ihrer Entwicklung?' p. 461).
Aceording to Mach the principle of economy of thinking determines the character of scientific investigation. What science states
as properties of things and laws about atoms are in reality relations
between sensations. The phenomena between which the law of gravitation establishes relations, consist in a number of visual, auditory
or tactile impressions; the law says that they occur not by chance,
and predicts how we may expect them. Of course we cannot express
the law in this form; it would be inappropriate, unsuitable to practice
because of its complexity. But as a principle, it is important to state
that every law of nature deals with relations between phenomena.
If now contradictions appear in our conceptions about atoms and
world ether, they lie not in nature but in the forms we choose for our
abstractions in order to have them available in the most tractable

way. The contradiction disappears when we express the results of
our research as relations between observed quantities, ultimately between sensations.
The unconcerned scientific view is easily obscured if a point of
view fit for a limited aim is made the basis of all considerations. This
the case, says Mach, "when all experiences are considered as the
effects of an outer world upon our consciousness. An 'apparently
inextricable tangle of metaphysical difficulties resdts. The phantom
disappears directly if we take matters in their mathematical form, and
make it clear to ourselves that the establishment of functions and relations alone avails, and that the mutual dependence of experiences is
the only thing we wish to know" ("Analyee der Empfindungen"
p. 28). It might seem B a t Mach here expresses some doubts about
the existence of an outer world independent of man. I n countleas
other sentences, however, he speaks in a clear way of mrrounding
nature in which we have to live and which we have .to investigate. It
means that such an outer world as is accepted by physics and by ordinary opinion, the world of matter and forces as producing the phenomena, leads us into contradictions. The contradictions can be removed
only if we return to the phenomena and instead of speaking worda
and abstract terms express our r e d t s as relations between observetions. This is what was afterwards called Mach's principle: if we
ask whether a statement has a meaning and what is its meaning, we
have to look for what experiments may test it. It has shown its importance in modern times, first in discussions on time and space in
the theory of relativity, and then in the understanding of atomic and
radiation phenomena. Mach's aim was to find a broader field of
interpretation for physical phenomena. In daily life the solid bodiee
are most adequate sensation-complexes, and mechanics, the science of
their motions, was the first well-developed part of physics. But this
reason does not justify our establishing the form and science of atoms
es the pattern for the entire world. Instead of explaining heat, light,
electricity, chemistry, biology, all in terms of such small particles,
every realm should develop its own adequate concepte.
Yet there is a certain ambiguity in Mach's expressions on the
outer world, revealing a manifest propensity towards subjectivism,
corresponding to the general mystical trend in the capitalist world.
Especially in later years he liked to discover cognate trends everywhere, and gave praise to idealistic philosophies that deny the reality
of matter. Mach did not elaborate his views into a concise coherent
aptem of philosophy with all consequences well developed. His aim
wes to give critical thoughts, to stimulate new ideas, often in paradoxes sharply pointed against prevailing opinions, without caring
whether all his statements were mutually consistent and all problems

solved. Hie was not a philosopher's mind constructing; a system, but
a scientist's mind, presenting his ideas as a partial contribution to
the whole, feeling as part of a collectivity of investigators, sure that
others will.correct his e m r s and will complete what he left unachieved.

.

"The supreme philosophy of a natural scientist" he says elsewhere
"is to be content with an incomplete world view and to prefer it to
an apparently complete but unsatisfactory system" ("Die Mechanik
in ihrer Entwicklung, " p. 437).
Mach's tendency to emphasize the subjective side of experience
appears in that the immediately given elements of the world, which we
call phenomena, are denoted as sensations. Surely this means a t the
same time' a deeper analysis of the phenomena; in the phenomenon
that a stone f a h are contained a number of visual sensations combined with the memory of former visual and spatial sensations. Mach's
elements, the sensations, may be called the simplest constituents of
the phenomena. But when he says : "Thus it is true that the world
consists of our sensations" ("Analyse der Empfindungen" p. 10)
he means to point to the subjective character of the elements of the
world. He does not say "my" sensations; solipsism (the doctrine that
I myself only am existing) is entirely foreign to him and is expressly
refuted; "I myself" is itself a complex of sensations. But where he
speaks of fellow-men in relation to the world of sensations, he is not
entirely clear.
"Just as little as I consider red and green as belonging to an individqal body, so little I make an essential difference-from this point
of view of general orientation-between my sensations and another's
sensatibns. The same elements are mutually connected in many
"myselfsn as their nodal points. These nodal points, however, are
nothing perennial, they arise and disappear and change continually"
( " h l y s e der Empfindungen" p. 294).

Here it must bq objected that "red" and "green" as belonging
to more bodies are not the simple sensational elements of experience,
but themselves already abstract concepts. It seems that Mach here
replaces the abstract concepts body and matter by other abstract concepts, qualities (md colors, that as realities appear in my and in another's sensations. And when he calls my sensation and another's
analogous sensation the same element, this word is taken in another
sense.
Mach's thesis that the world consists of our sensations, expresses
the truth that we know of the world only through our sensations;
they are the materials out of which we build our world; in this sense
the world, including myself, "consists" of sensations only. A t the
m e time, the emphesie upon the subjective character of sensations
reveals the same middle-class trend of thought that we find in other

contemporary philosophies. It is even more evident when he points
out that these views may tend to overcome dualism, this eternal philosophical antithesis of the two worlds of matter and mind. The physical and the psychical world for Mach consist of the same elements,
only in a different arrangement. The sensation green in seeing a leaf,
with other sensations is an element of the material leaf; the same sensation, with others of my body, my eye, my reminiscences, is an
element of "myself, " of my psyche.
"Thus I see no antithesis of the physical and the psychical, but I see
a simple identity relative to these elements. In the sensual realm of
my consciousness every object is physical and psychioal at the same
time" ("Analyse der Empfindungen" p. 36). "Not the stuff is different in both realms, but the tendency of the research" (pag. 14).

Thus dualism has disappeared; the entire world is a unity, consisting of the selfsame elements; and these elements are not a t o m
but sensations. And in "Erkemtnis und Irrtum" he adds in a footnote
"There is no difficulty in building up every physical happening out
of sensations, i.e. psychiml elements; but there is no possibility of
seeing how out of the usual physical elements, masses and motions,
any psychical happening might be constructed.
We have to consider that nothing can be object of experience or science that cannbt
be in some way a part of consciou~ness'~
(p. 12).

...

Here, in this footnote added later, in 1905, the well-considered
equivalence of both worlds, physical and psychical, the careful neutral characterizing of the elements, is given up by calling them paychical, and the anti-materialistic spirit of the bourgeoisie breaks
through. Since it is not our aim to criticize and to contest but only
to set forth Mach's views we shall not enter into the tautology of the
last sentence, that only what is in consciousness can be conscious and
that hence the world is spiritual.
The new insight that the world is built up out of sensations as
its elements, meets with difficulties, Mach says, because in our uncritical youth we took over a world view that had grown intuitively in
the thousands of years of human development. We may break its
spell by critically repeating the process through conscious philosophic
reasoning. Starting with the most simple experiences, the elementary
sensations, we construct the world step by step: ourselves, the outer
world, our body as part of the outer world, connected with our own
feelings, actions and reminiscences. Thus, by analogg, we recognize
fellow-men as kindred, and so their sensations, disclosed by their sayings, may be used as additional material in constructing the world.
Here Mach stops; further steps toward an objective world are not
made.

no accidental incompleteness is shown by the fact
That tl&g
tbpt W B find the same thing with Carnap, one of the leading thinkers

in modern philosophy of science. In his work "Der logische Aufbau
der Welt" (The logical construction of the world) he sets himself the
same task, but more thoroughly: if we start with knowing nothing,
having however our full capacity of thinking, how can we establish
(4'constitute") the world with all its contents l I start with "my
sensations " and make them inb a system of "sayings " and "objects "
("object" is the name given to everything about which we may utter
a saying) ; thus I establish physical and psychical "objects" and construct "the world" as an ordered system of my sensations. The problem of dualism of body and mind, of material and spiritual, finds
here the same answer as with Mach :both consist of the same materials,
the sensations, only ordered in a different way. The sensations of
fellow-men, according to their statements, lead to a phyaical world
exactly corresponding to mine. So we call it the "intersubjective
world," common to all subjects; this is the world of natural science.
Here Carnap stops, satisfied that dualism has been removed, and that
any quest about the reality of the world is now shown to be mefiningless, because "reality" cannot be tested in another way than by our
experience, our sensations. So the chain of progressive constitutings
is broken off here.
It is easy to see the limitedness of this world structure. It is not
finished. The world thus constituted by Mach and by Carnap is a
mementary world supposed unchanging. The fact that the world is
in continuous evolution is disregarded. So we must go on past where
Carnap stopped. According to our experience people are born and
die; their sensations arise and disappear, but the world remains.
When my sensations out of which the world was constituted, cease
with my death, the world continues to exist. From acknowledged
scientific facts I know that long ago there was a world without man,
without any living being. The facts of evolution, founded on our sensations condensed into science, establish a previous world without any
mnsations. Thus from an intersubjective world common to all mankind, constituted as a world of phenomena by science, we proceed to
the constitution of an objective world. Then the entire world view
changes. Once the objective world is constituted, all phenomena
become independent of observing man, as relationh between parts of
the world. The world is the totality of an infinite number of pa*
acting upon another; every part consists in the totality of its actions
and reactions with the rest, and all these mutual actions are the phenomena, the objem of science. Man also is part of the world; we too
are the totality of our mutual interactions with the rest, the outer
world. Our sensations are now seen in a new light; they are the
38
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a small part of all happenings in
nes immediately given to us. When
out of his sensations, it is a reconruction in the mind of an already objectively existing world. Again
have the world twofold, 'with all the problems of epistemology,
e theory of knowledge. How they may be solved without metaphyis shown by Historical Materialism.
If one asks why two such prominent philosophers of science omitted this obvious step toward the constitution of an objective world,
the answer can only be found in their middle-class world view. Their
instinctive tenet is anti-materialistic. By adhering to the intersubjective world they have won a monistic world system, the physical
world consisting of psychical elements, so that materialism is refuted.
We have here an instructive example how class views determine
ience and philosophy.
Summarizing Mach's ideas we distinguish two steps. First the
nomena are reduced to sensations expressing their subjective charirect reality only in the sensations
as psychical entities, he does not proceed by precise deductions to an
objective world that obviously is matter of fact, though in a mystical
vague way. Then comes a second step from the world of phenomena
to the physical world. What physics, and by the popular dispersion
of science also common opinion, assumes as the reality of the worldmatter, atoms, energy, natural laws, the forms of space and time,
myself-are all abstractions from groups of phenomena. Mach combines both steps into one by saying that things are sensation-complexes.
The second step corresponds to Dietzgen; the similarity here is
manifest. The differences are accounted for by their different class
views. Dietzgen stood on the basis of dialectic materialism, and his
expositions were a direct consequence of Marxism. Mach, borne by
the incipient reaction of the bourgeoisie, saw his task in a fundamental
criticism of .physical materialism by asserting dominance to some
spiritual principle. There is a difference, moreover, in personality
and aims. Dietzgen was a comprehensive philosopher, eager to find
out how our brains work; the practice of life and science was to him
material for the knowledge of knowledge. Mach was a physicist who
by his criticisms tries to improve the ways in which brains worked in
scientific investigations. Dietzgen's aim was to give clear insight
into the role of knowledge in social development, for the use of the
proletarian struggle. Mach's aim was an amelioration of the practice
of physical research, for the use of natural science.
Speaking of practice, Mach expresses himself in different ways.
At one time he sees no utility in employing the ordinary abstractions:
"We know only of sensations, and the assumption of those nuclei

(particles of matter') and their mutual actions as the assigned origins
of sensations, shows itself entirely futile and superMuous'' ("Analyse
der Empfindungen" p. 10). Another time he does not wish to dis-

-

.

credit the common view of unsophistica&d "naive realism," because
it renders great services to mankind in their common life. It has
grown as a product of nature, whereas every philosophical system is
an ephemeral product of art, for temporary aims. So we have to see
"why and to what purposes we usually take one point of view, and
why and to what purpose we temporarily give it up. No point of
view holds absolutely; each imports for special aims only, " ( " h a lyse der Empfindungen" P. 30).
I n the practical application -of his views upon physics Mach met
with little success. His campaign was chiefly directed against matter
and atoms dominating physical science. Not simply because they are
and should be acknowledged as abstractions: "Atoms we can observe
nowhere, they are as every substance products of thought" ("Die
Mechanik in ihrer Entwicklung" p. 463). But because they are impractical abstractions. They mean an attempt to reduce all physics
to mechanics, to the motion of small particles, "and it is easy to see
that by mechanical hypotheses a real economy of scientific thought
cannot be achieved" ("Die Mechanik in ihrer EntwicHung" p. 469).
But his criticism of heat as a form of motion of small particles, already
in 1873, and of electricity as a streaming fluid, found no echo among
physicists. On the contrary these explanations developed in ever
wider applications, and their consequences were confirmed ever again ;
atomic theory could boast of ever more results and was extended even
to electricity in the theory of electrons. Hence the generation of physicists that followed him, while sympathizing with his general views
and accepting them, did not follow him in his special applieations.
Only in the new century, when atomic and electronic theory had progressed in a brilliant display, and when the theory of relativity arose,
there appeared a host of glaring contradictions in which'Mach's principles showed themselves the best guides in clearing up the difficulties.

AVENARIUS
The title of henin's work "Materialism and Empiriocriticism "
imposes the necessity to treat here the Zurich philosopher Richard
Avenarius, because empiriocriticism was the name he gave to his doctrine, in many parts touching upon Mach's views. I n his chief work
''Kritik der reinen Erf ahmng' ' (Criticism of pure experience) he
starts from simple experience, considers carefully what is certain about
it, and then tests critically what man derived and assumed about the
world and himself, what is tenable and justifiable in it and what is
not.
I n the natural world view, he explains, I find the following things.
I find myself with thoughts and feelings within a surrounding world ;
to these surroundings belong fellow-men acting and speaking as I do,
whom therefore I assume to be similar to myself. Strictly speaking,
the interpretation of the movements and sounds connected with fellow-man as having a meaning just as mine is an assumption, not a
real experience. But it is a necessary wumption without which a
reasonable world view would be impossible : "the empiriocritical basic
asmaption of human equality." Then this is my world : first my
own statements, e.g. "I see (or touch) a tree" (I call this an observation) ; I find it, repeatedly, back a t the same spot, I describe it as an
object in space; I call it "world," distinct from myself, or "outer
world." Moreover I have remembrances (I call them ideas), somehow analogous to observations. Secondly there are' fellow-men as part
of the world. Thirdly there are statements of the fellow-men dealing
with the same world; he speaks to me of the tree he, too, is seeing;
what he says clearly depends on the "world." So f a r all is simple
and natural, there is nothing more to have thoughts about, nothing of
inner and outer, of soul and body.
Now, however, I say: my world is object of the observation of my
fellow-man; he is the bearer of the observation, it & part of him; I
put it into him, and so I do with his other experiences, thoughts, feelings, of which I know through his sayings. I say that he has an "impression" of the tree, that he makes himself a "conception" of the
tree. A n impression, a conception, a sensation of another person,
however, is imperceptible to me; it finds no place in my world of
experience. By so doing I introduce something that has a new character, that can never be experience to me, that is entirely foreign to
dl that so f a r was present. Thus my fellow-man has now got a n inner
world of observations, feelings, knowledge, and an outer world that

he o b ~ r v eand
~ know. Since I stand to him as he stands to me I
tao have an inner vorld of sensations and feelings opposite to that
wMt& I call the "outer" world. The tree I saw and know is split into
a howledge and an object. This process is called "introjection" by
Avenarius; something k introduced, introjected into man that was
not present in the original simple empirid world conceptin* .
Introjeetion has made a -cleavage in the world. It is the philosophical f d l of m a . Before the fall he was in a state of phil~phicetl
innocence; he took the world as simple, dngle, as the senses show it ;
he did not know of body and soul, of mind and matter, of good and
evil The intmjection brought dualism with all its problems and contr&o$im. Let ns look at its aomquace;l$ already at the lowest
&at&- of civilization. On the basis of experienoe introjection takes
place not only into fellow-man but also into fellow-animal$ into fellow-thin&;sjinto trees, roehs, etc: this is animism. We see a man sleeping; awakened he says he was elsewhere; so part of higl rested here,
part left the body tempomily. If it does not return, the first part ie
rotting &way,but the other part appean, in dxeams, g h d y . 80 man
comists of a perishable body and a non-perishing spirit. $uch spirits
sleo live in trees, in the sir, in heaven. At a higher stage of aivilieetion the direct erperienoa of spirits disappears; what ia experienced
is the outer world of iwnaes; the inner spiritual world is supar-aenwsl.
"Experience as things and experience ae bowledge now stand agdnrst
one a ~ t h e rincomparable
,
ss a materid and a spirit& world" ( " ~ r i tik der reinen E r f d q " g 110).
In this &ort snmmary of Avenarias' exposure of hk views we
.olDiitbd one thing that to him is an essential link in the ahsin. To
the sayings of the fellow-man belone not only himmu and hia body,
but belongs in particular hia brain. In my experience, Avenarim
sap, I have three dependenciee: between the sayings of man wd hie
outer world, behmm his brain and the onter world, and between his
brain and his tmyhga. The m n d is a phHd relation, part of the
law of energy; the other two belong to logic.
Avenarius now proceede first to ariieise and then to eliminate
intmjection. Thht actione and sayings of feUow-men are related to
the outer world i s my experience. When I intmduee it as ideas into
him, it is into his brain that I introduce them. But no anatomical
section can disclose them. "We cannot find any characteristic in the
thought or in the brain to show that thought is a part or character
of the brain'? ("ICritilr der reinen Erfahmng" 0 126). Man can
say truly: I have brain; i.e. to the complex called "myself" brain
belongs as a part; he can say truly: I have thoughts, i.e. to the complex
"myself" thoughts belong as a part. But that does not imply that
my brain have these thoughts. "Thought is thought of myself, but

not therefore thought of my brain" ("Kritik der reinen Erfahrung
§ 131). "Brain ieno lodging or site,no producer, no instrument or
organ, no bearer or substratum, etc., of thinking. . . Thinking is no
resident or commander, no other side, no product either, not even
a physiological function of the brain " ("K~itik der reinen Erfah-
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This imposing enumeration of usual psychological statements disses why the brain was introduced. To refute our introjection of
a mental world into fellow-man, Avqnarius emphasizes that its place
would then be the brain, and 'the brain when anatomically dissected
does not show it. Elsewhere he says: introjection means that my
thinking puts itself at the place of fellow-man, hence my thinking
combines with his brain, which can be done only in fmtasy, not really.
AB arguments to serve as the basis of a philosophical system they are
rather artificial and unconvincing. What -is tnie and important is
the disclosure of the fact of introjection, the demonstration that in
our assumption that the world of fellow-man is the same kind of thing
as my own, I introduce a second world of fantasy of another character, entirely outside my experience. It corresponds point for point
with my own; its introduction is necessary; but it means a doubling
of the world, or rather a multiplication of worlds not directly accessible to me, no possible part of my world of experience.
Now Avenarius sees as his tas$ the building up of a world-structure free from introjection, by means of the simple data of experience.
In his exposition he finds it necessary to introduce a special system
of new names, characters and figures with algebraic expressions to
designate our ordinary concepts. The laudable intention is this; not
to be led astray by instinctive associations and meanings connected
with ordinary language. But the result is an appearance of profoundness with an abstruse terminolow' that nee& to be back-translated
into our usual terms if we want to understand its meanings, and is
a source of easy misunderstandings. His argument expressed thus
by himself in a far more intricate way, may be summarized as follows :
We find .ourselves, a relative constant, amidet s changing multitude of units denoted as ''trees, '' ''f ellow-men," etc., which show many
mutual relations. "Myself" and "surroundings" are found both at
the same time in the same experience; we call them "central-part"
and "counter-part" (Zentralglied und Gegenglied). That my fellowman has thoughts, experiences and a world just as I have, is expressed
in the statement that part of my surroundings is central-part itself.
When in his brain variations take place (they belong to my world of
experience), then phenomena occur in his world; his sayings about
them are determined by processes in his brains. I n my world of experience the outer world determines the change in his brain (a neurological

fact) ; not my observed tree determines his observation (situated in
another world), but the changes caused by the tree in his brain (both
belonging to my world) determine his observation. Now my scientifia
experience declares my brain and his brain to change in the same
way through impressions of the outer world; hence the resulting
"his world" and my world must be of the same stuff. So the natural
world-conception is restored without the need of introjection. The
argument comes down to this that our practice of assuming similar
thoughts and conceptions as our own in fellow-men, which should be
illicit notwithstanding our spiritual intercourse, should become valid
as soon as we make a detour along the material brains. To which
must be remarked that neurology may assume as a valid theory that
the outer world produces the same changes in my brain and in another
man's; but that, strictly keeping to my experience, I have never
observed it and never can observe it.
Avenarius' i d e a have nothing in common with Dietzgen; they do
not deal with the connection between knowledge and experience. They
are cognate to Mach's in that both proceed from experience, dissolve
the entire world into experience, and believe thus to have done away
,
with dualism.
"If we keep 'complete experience' free from d l adulteration, our
world-conception will be free from d l metaphysical dualism. To
these eliminated dualisms belong the abmlute antithesis of 'body'
and 'mind,' bf 'matter' and 'spirit,' in short of physical and psychical"
$118). "Things physical, matter in its metaphysical absolute sense
finds no place in purified 'complete experience,' because 'matter' in
this conception is only an abstractum, indicating the entirety of
counter-parts when abstraction is made of all 'central-parts"'
("Bemerkungen zum Begriff des Gegenstandes der Psychologie"
5 119).

This is analogous to Mach ; but it is different from Mach in being
built out into a finished and closed system. The equality of the experience of fellow-man, settled by Mach in a few words, is a most difficult piece of work to Avenarins. The neutral character of the elements of experience is pointed out with more precision by Avenarius;
they are no sensations, nothing psychioal, but simply something
"found present " (Vorgefundenes).
So he opposes prevailing psychology, that formerly dealt with the
''soul, " afterwards with "psychic functions, " because it proceeds
froln the assumption that the observed world is an image within us.
This, he says, is not a "thing found present," and neither can it be
disclosed from what is "found present. "

*

"Whereas I leave the tree before me as something seen in the same
relation to me, as a thing 'found present' to me, prevailing psycholbgy
puts the tree as 'something seen' into man, especially into his brainm

("Bemerkungen zum Begriff des Gegenstandes der Psychologiew

g 45 Note). Introjection created this false object of psychology; it

changed "before me" into "in me," what is "found present" into what
is "imagined;" it made "part of (real) surroundings" intb "part of
(ideal) thinking."

For Avenarius, instead, the material changes in the brain are the
basis of psychology. He proceeds from the thesis taken over from the
special science of physiology that all action of the surroundings produces changes in the brain and that these produce thoughts and say.
ings-and this certainly lies outside direct experience. It is a curious
fact that Mach and Carnap too speak of observing (ideally, not really) the brain (by physical or chemical methods, or by a "brain-mirror") to see what happens there in connection with sensations and
thoughts. It seems that middle-class theory of knowledge cannot do
without having recourse to this materialist conception. Avenarius is
the most radical in this respect; for him psychology is the science of
the dependence of behavior upon the brain; what belongs to the
actions of man is not psychical but physiological, mere brain processes. When we speak of ideas and ideologies, empiriocriticism speaks
of changes in the central nervous system. The study of the great
world-moving ideas in the history of mankind turns into the study of
their nervous systems. Thus empiriocriticism stands close to middleclass materialism that also, in the problem of the determination of
ideas by the surrounding world, appeals to brain-matter. I n comparing Avenarius with Haeckel we should rather call him Haeckel reversed. Both can understand mind only as an attribute of the brain;
since mind and matter, however, are fundamentally disparate, Haeckel attributes a particle of mind to every atom, whereas Avenarius
entirely dispenses with the mind as a special something. But therefore
the world for him takes instead the somewhat shadowy characterfrightening to materialists and opening the gate to ideological interpretations-of consisting of ''my experience" only.
Right as Avenarius may be that it is not strictly experience, the
equalization of fellow-men with ourselves and the identity of their
world with ours is an inevitable natural affair, whatever kind of
spiritual or material terms are used to express it. The point is again
that middle-class philosophy wants to criticize and correct human
thinking instead of trying to understand it as a natural process.
In this context a general remark must be made. The essential
character in Msch and Avenarius, as in most modern philosophers
of science, is that they start from personal experience. It is their
only basis of certainty; to it they go back when asked what is true.
When fellow-men enter into the play, a kind of theoretical uncertainty appears, and with difficult reasonings their experience must

be reduced to ours. We have here an effect of the strong individua
of the middle-class world. The middle-class individual in his strong
feeling of personality has lost social consciousness; he does not know
how entirely he .is a social being. In everything of himself, in his
body, his mind, his life, his thoughts, his feeling, in his most simple
experiences he is a product of society; human society made them all
what they are. What is considered a purely personal sensation: I see
enter into consciousness only through the 'distinctnese
a tre-an
given to it by names. Without the inherited words to indicate things
and species, actions and concepts, the sensation could not be expressed
and conceived. Out of the indistinctive mass of the world of impressions the important parts come forward only when they are denoted
by sounds and thus become separated from the unimportant mass.
When Carnap constructs the world without using the old names, he
still makes use of his capacity of abstract thinking. Abstract thinking, however, by means of concepts, is not possible without speech;
speech and abstract thinking developed together as s product of
society.
Speech could never have originated without human society for
which it is an organ of mutual communication. It could develop in
a society only, as an instrument in the practical activity of man. This
activity is a social process that as the deepest foundation underlies
all my experiences. The activity of fellow-man, inclusive his speaking,I experience as co-natural with my activity because they are parts
of one common activity; thus we know our similarity. Man is first an
active being, a worker. To live he must eat, i.e. he must seize and
assimilate other things; he must search, fight, conquer. This action
upon the world, a life-necessity, determinm his thinking and feeling,
because it is his chief life content and forms the most essential pa*
of his experiences. It was from the first a collective activity, a social
labor process. Speech originated as part of this collective process,
as an indispensable mediator in the common work, and at the same
time as an instrument of reflexive thinking needed in the handling
of tools, themselves products of collective working. I n such a way
the entire world of experience of man bears a social character. The
simple "natural world view" taken by Avenarins and other philosophers as their starting point, is not the spontaneous view of a primitive single man but, in philosophical garb, the outcome of a highly
developed society.
Social development has, through the increasing division of labor,
dissected and separated what before was a unit. Scientists and philosophers have the special task of investigating and reasoning so that
their science and their conceptions may play their role in the total
process of produetion-now
the role chiefly of supporting and

~trengtheningthe existing sociirl system. Cut off from the root of
life, the social procesa of labor, they hang in the air and have to resort
to artificial reasonings to find a basis. Thus the philosopher starts
with ,imagining himself the only being on earth and suspiciotdy aeks
whether he can demonstrate his own existence; till he is happily reassured by Descartes ''I thing,so I exist. " Then along a chain of logical
deductions he proceeds to ascertain the existence of the world and of
fellow-men; and so the self-evident comes out along a wide detourif it comes out. For the middle-class philosopher does not feel the
necessity to follow up to the last consequences, to materialism, and he
prefers to stay somewhere in-between, expressing the world in ideological terms.
So this is the difference: middle-class philosophy looks for the
source of knowledge in personal meditation, Marxism finds it in social
labor. All consciousness, all spiritual life of man, even of the most
lonely hermit, is a collective product, has been made and shaped by
the working community of mankind. Though in the form of personal
consciousness-because man is a biological individual-it can exist
only as part of the whole. People can have experiences only as social
beings; though the contents are personally different, in their essence
experiences are super-personal, society being their self-evident basis.
Thus the objective world of phenomena which logical thought constructs out of the data of experience, is first and foremost, by its
origin already, collective experience of mankind.

How Mach's idea could acquire importance in the Russian socialist
movement, may be understood from social conditions.' The young
Russian intelligentsia, owing to the barbarous pre-capitalist conditions, had not yet, as in Western Europe, found its social function in
the service of a bourgeoisie. So it had to aspire for the downfall of
Czarism, and to join the socialist party. At the same time it stood in
spiritual intercourse with the Western intellectuals and so took part
in the spiritual trends of the Western world. Thus it was inevitable
that efforts should be made to combine them with Marxism.
Of course Lenin had to oppose these tendencies. Marxian theory,
indeed, can gain nothing essential from Mach. Insofar as a better nnderstanding of human thinking is needed for socialists, this can be
found in Dietzgen's work. Mach was significant because he deduced

,

andogous ideas out of the practices of natural science, for the use of
scientists. In what*he has in common with Dietzgen, the reduction
of the world to experience, he stopped midway and gave, imbued with
the anti-materialist trends of his time, a vague idealistic form to his
views. This could not be grafted upon Marxism. Here Marxist criticism was needed.

The Cfiticism
lienin, however in attacking Mach, from the start presents the
antagonism in a wrong way. Proceeding from a quotation of Engels,
he says:
"But the question here is not of this br &at formulation of materialism, but of the opposition of materialism to idealism, of the difference between the two fundamental lines in philosophy. Are we to
proceed from things to sensation and thbaght? O r are we to proceed
from thought and sensation to things? The first line, i.e., the materialist line, is adopted by Engels. The second line, i.e., the idealist
line, is adopted by Machsp(34). (*)

It is at once clear that this is not the true expression of the antithesis. According to materialism the material world produces thought,
consciousness, mind, all things spiritual. That, on the contrary, the
spiritual produces the material world, is taught by religion, is found
with Hegel, but is not Mach's opinion. The expression "to proceed
from . to" is used to intermix two quite different meanings. Proceeding from things to sensations and thought means: things create
thoughts. Proceedhg-not from thoughts to things, as lienin wrongly
imputes to Mach but-from sensations to things, means that only
through sensations we arrive at the knowledge of things. Their entire
existence is built up out of sensations; to emphaaiee this truth Mach
says: they consist of sensations.
Here the method followed by Lenin in his controversy makes its
appearance; he tries to assign to Mach opinions different from the
real ones. Especially the doctrine of solipsism. Thus he continues:

..

"No evasions, nb sophisms ( a multitude of which we shall yet encounter) can remove the clear and indisputable fact. that Ernst Mach's
doctrine bf thinge a s complexes of sensations in subjective idealism
and a simple rehash of Berkeleianism. If bodies are "complexes of
sensations," a s Mach says or "combinations of sensations," as Berkeley said, it inevitably follows that the whole world is but my idea.
Starting from such a premise it is impossible to arrive at the exist(*) All numbers in parantheses refer to pages in Lenin's Materialism

and Empirio-Criticism, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1947.

(

ence of other people besides oneself: it is the purest solipsism. Much
as Mach, Avenarius, Petzoldt and the others may abjure solipsism,
they cannot in fact escape solipsism without falling into howling
logical absurdities." (34)

Now, if anything can be asserted beyond any doubt about Mach
and Avenarius, it is that their opiniom are not solipsism; fellow-men
similar to myself, deduced with more or less stringent logic, are the
basis of their world-conception. Lenin, however, manifestly does not
care about what Mach really thinks, but about what he should think
if his logic were identical with Lenin's.
"From which there is only one possible inference, namely, that the
'world consists only of my sensations.' The word 'our' employed by
Mach instead of 'my' is employed illegitimately." (36)

That indeed is an easy way of arguing: what I write down as the
opinion of my adversary he replaces unjustifiably by what he wrote
down himself. Lenin, moreover, know8 quite well that Mach speaks
of the objective reality of the world, and himself gives numerous quotations to that effect. But he does not let himself be deceived as so
many others were deceived by Mach.

.. .

"Similarly, even Mach
frequently strays into a materialist interpretation of the word experience
(149). Here nature is taken as
primary and sensati'on and experience as products. Had Mach consistently adhered to his point of view in the fundamental questions
Mach's special 'philosophy' is here thrown overof epistemology
board, and the author instinctively accepts the customary standpoint
of the scientists." (150)

...

...

Would it not have been better if he had tried to understand in
what sense it was that Mach assumes that things consist of sensations?
The "elements " also are an object of difficulty to Lenin. He summarizes Mach's opinion on the elements in six theses, among which
we find, in numbers 3 and 4:
''Elements are divided into the physical and the psychical; the latter
is that which depends on the human nerves and the human brganisnd
generally; the former does not depend on them; the connection of
physical elements and the connection of psychical elements, it is
declared, do not exist separately from each other; they exist only
in conjunction." (47)

Anybody, even if acquainted only superficially with Mach, can
see how he is rendered here in an entirely wrong and meaningless way.
What Mach really says is this: every element, though described in
many words, is an inseparable unity,which can be part of a complex
that we call physical, but which combined with different other
elements can form a complex that we call psychical. When I feel the

'

heat of a flame, this sensation together with others on heat and thermometers and with visible. phenomena combines into the complex
"flame" or "heat," treated in physics. Combined with other sensations of pain and pleasure, with remembrances and with observations
on nerves, the context belongs to physiology or psychology. "None
(of these oonnections) is the only existing one, both are present at
the same time" sap Mach. For they are the same elements in different combinations. Lenin makes of this that the connections are not
independent and only exht together. Mach does not separate the
elements themselves in physical and psychical ones, nor does he distinguish a physical and psychicel part in them; the same element is
physical in one context, psychical in another. If Lenin renders these
ideas in such a sloppy and unintelligible way it is no wonder that he
cannot make any sense out of it, and speaks of "an incoherent jumble
of antithetical philosophical points of view.'? (47) If one does not
take the pains or is unable to unravel the wl opinions of his adversary and only snatches up some sentences to interpret them from one's
own point of View, he should not wonder that nonsense comes out.
This cannot be called a mandan criticism of Mach.
In the same faulty way he renders Avenarius. He reproduces a
small summary by Avenarins of a first division of the elements: what
I find present I partly call outer world (e.g. I see a tree), partly not
(I remember a tree, ththinkof a tree). Avenarins denotes them as
thing-like (sachhaft) and thought-like (gedankenhaft ) element%.
Thereupon Lenin indignantly exclaims :
"At first we are a s s ~ e dthat the 'elements' are sbmething new, both
phMcal and psyehical at the same time; then a little correction is
sarreptitbusly imerted: instead of the crude, materialist differentiation of matter (bodies, thin@) and the psychical (sensations, recollections, fmtasiers) we are presented with the doctrine of 'recent
positivism' regarding elements substantial and elements mental." (50)

.

Clearly he does not wapect how completely he misses the point.
In a chapter superscribed with the ironical title "Does man think
with his brain 9" Lenin quotes Avenarius' statement that the brain
is not the lodging, the site, etc. of thinking; thinking is no resident,
no product, etc. of the brain. Hence: man does not think with his
brain. Lenin has not perceived that Avenarius further on expresses
clearly enough, though garbed in his artificial terminology, that the
action of the outer world upon the brain produces what we call
thoughts; manifestly Lenin had not the patience to unravel Avenarim' intricate language. But to combat an opponent- you have to
know hie point; ignorance is no argument. What Avenarius contradicts is not the role of the brain but that we call the product thought
when we assign to it, as a spiritual being, a site in the brain and say

g in the brain, is commanding the brain, or is a function of

. The material brain, as we saw, occupies precisely the cenosophy. Lenin, however, considers -this only as
"Avenariu8 here acts on the advice of the charlatan in Turgeniev:
denounce most of all thbse vices which you yourself possess. Avenarius tries to pretend that he is combatting idealism.
While distracting the attention of the reader by attacking idealism, Avenarius
is in fact defending idealism, albeit in slightly different words:
thought is not s function of the brain; the brain is not the organ of
thought; sensations are-not 5unctibns of the nervous system, oh,
no! sensations are-'elements"'
(84).

...

I
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he critic rages here against a self-mystification without any basis.
nds "idealism" in that Avenarius, proceeds from elements, and
re sensations. Avenarius, however, does not proceed frond
sensations but from what simple unsophisticated man finds present:
things, surroundings, a world, fellow-men, remembrances. Man does
not find present sensations, he finds present a world. Avenarius tries
to construct a description of the world without the common language
of matter and mind and its contradictiok. He finds trees present,
and human brains, and-so he b e l i e v s h a n g e s in the brains produced by the trees, and actions and talk of fellow-men determined by
these changes. Of all this Lenin manifestly has no inkling. He tries
to make ''idealism " of Avenarius ' system by considering Avenarius '
starting point, experience, to be sensations, something psychical,
materialist view. His error is that he takes the
tion materialism-idealism in the sense of middle-class
materialism, with physical matter as its basis. Thus he shuts himself
off completely from any understanding of modern views that proceed
ce and phenomena as the given reality.
Lenin now brings forward an array of witnesses to declare that
the doctrines of Mach and Avenarius are idealism or solipsism. It' is
natural that the host of professional philosophers, in compliance with
the tendency of bourgeois thinking to proclaim the rule of mind over
matter, try to interpret and emphasize the anti-materialist side of
their ideas; they too know materialism only as the doctrine of physical matter. What, we may ask, is the use of such witnesses? When
disputed facts have to be ascertained, witnesses are necessary. When,
however, we deal with the understanding of somebody's opinions and
theories, we have to read and render carefully what he himself has
written to expound them; this is the only may to find out similarities
and differences, truth and error. For Lenin, however, matters were
different. His book was part of a law-suit, an act of impeachment;
as such it required an array of witnesses. An important political issue

was at stake ; Machism threatened to corrupt the fundamental doc'

trines, the theoretical unity of the Party; so its spokesmen had to do
away with them. Mach and Avenarius formed a danger for the Party
hence what ~ t t e r e dwas not to find out what was true and valuable
in their teachings in order to widen our own views. What mattered
was to discredit them, to destroy their reputation, to reveal them as
muddle-heads contradicting themselves, speaking confused fudge,
trying to hide their real opinions and not believing their own aasertions.
All the middle-class philosophical writers, standing before the
newness of these ideas, -look for analogies and relationships of Mach
and Avenarius with former philosophic systems; one welcomes Mach
as fitting in with Kant, another sees a likeness to Hume, or Berkeley,
or Fichte. I n this multitude and variety of systems it is easy to find
out connections and similarities everywhere. Lenin registers all such
contradictory judgments and in this way demonstrates Mach's confusion. The like with Avenarius. For instance:
a;

"And it is difficult to say who more rudely unmasks Avenarius the
mystifier--Smith by his straightforward and clear refutation, or
Schuppe by his enthusiastic opinion of Avenarius' crowning work
The kiss of Wilhelrn Schuppe in philos'ophy is no better than the kiss
of Peter Struve or Menshikov in politics" (67).

If we now read Schuppe's "Open Letter to Avenarius, " in which
in flattering words he expresses his agreement, we find that he did
not at alI grasp the essence of Avenarius' opinion; he takes the
"myself" as the starting point instead of the elements found present,
out of which Avenarius constructs the "myself ". He misrepresents
Avenarius in the same way as Lenin does, with this difference. that
+hat displeased Lenin
him. In his answer Avenarius, & the
courteous words usual among scholars, testifies to his satisfaction at
the assent of such a famous thinker, but then again expounds the real
contents of his doctrine. henin neglects the contents of these explanations which refute his conclusions, and quotes only the compromising courtesies.

Natural 8 c i m e
Over against Mach's ideas Lenin puts the materialistic views, the
objective reality of the material world, of matter, light-ether, laws
of nature, such as natural science and human common sense accept.
These last are two respectable authorities; but in this case their weight
is not very great. Lenin sneeringly quotes Mach's own confession
that he found little consent among his colleagues. A critic, however,
who brings new ideas cannot be refuted by the statement that it is

52

C

the old criticized ideas that are generally accepted. And as to common sense, i.e. the totality of opinions of uninstructed people: they
usually represent the dicta of science of a former period, that gradually, by teaching and popular books, seeped down the masses. That
the earth revolves around the sun, that the world consists of indestructible matter, that matter consists of atoms, that the world is eternal
and infinite-all
this has gradually penetrated into the minds,
first of the educated classes, then of the masses. When science proceeds
to newer and better views, all this old knowledge can, as "common
me," be brought forward against them.
How urnspectingly Lenin leans upon these two authorities-and
en in a wrong way-is seen when he says:
"For every scientist who has not been led astray by professorial philosophy, as well as for every materialist, sensation is indeed the direct
connection between consci'ousness and the external world; it is the
transformation of the energy of external excitation into a state of
consciousness. This transformation has been, and is, observed by
each of us a million times on every hand" (44).

This "observing" is of the same kind as when one should say:
see a thousand times that our eye sees and that light falls upon the
ina. I n reality we do not see our seeing and our retina; we see
objects and infer the retina and the seeing. We do not observe energy
and its transitions; we observe phenomena, and out of these phenomena physicists have abstracted the concept of energy. The transformation of energy is a summarized physical expression for the many
phenomena in which one measured quantity decreased, another increased. They are all good expedient concepts and inferences, reliable
in the prediction of future phenomena, and so we call them true.
Lenin takes this truth in such an absolute way that he thinks he expresses an observed fact "adopted by every materialist," when he
pronounces what is actually a physi&l theory. Moreover his exposition is wrong. That energy of the light-impression is converted into
consciousness may have been the belief of middle-class materialists,
but science does not Bnow of it. Physical science says that energy
transforms exclusively7and completely, into other energy; the energy
of the light-impression is transformed into other forms: chemioal,
al, heat-energy; but consciousness is not known in physics as
confounding of the real, observed world and the physical
permeates Lenin's work on every page. Engels denoted materialists as those who considered nature the original thhg. Lenin
speaks of a "materialism which regards nature, matter, as primary"
(41). And in another place: "matter is the objective reality given
to us in sensations" (145). To Lenin nature and physical mat-

tar sre identical; the name matter has the same meaning as objective
world. In this he agrees with middle-class materialism that in the
same way considers matter as the real substance of the world. Thus
his angry polemics against Mach can be easily understood. To Mach
matter is an abstract concept formed out of the phenomena--or more
strictly: sensations. So Lenin, now finding the denial of the reality
of matter, then reading the simple statement of the reality of the
world, sees o d y confusion; and he pretends, now, that Mach is a solipsist and denies the existence of the world, and then scornfully
remarks that Mach throws his own philosophy to the winds and returns
to scientific views.
With the laws of nature the case is analogous. Mach's opinion
that cause and-effect as well as natural laws do not factually exist in
nature, but are man-made expressions of observed regularities, is asserted by Lenin to be identical with Kant's doctrine.

".
..It is man whb dictates laws to nature and not nature that dictates laws to man! The important thing is not the repetition of Kant's
doctrine of apriorism . . . but the fact that reason, mind, consciousness are here primary, and nature secondary. It is not reason that
is a part of nature, one of its highest products, the reflectitm of its
processes, but nature that is a part of reason, which thereby is
stretched from the ordinary, simple human reason known to us all
to a 'stupenhua,' as Dietzgen puts it, mysterious, divine reason. The
fintian-Machian formula, that 'man gives laws to nature,' is a fideist
fornula" (161).

This oonfnsed tirade, entirely missing the point, can only be understood if we consider that for Lenin "nature" consists not only in
matter but also in natural laws directing its behimior, floating somehow
in the world as commanders who must be obeyed by the things. Hence
to deny the objective existence of these laws means to him the denial
of nature itself; to make man the creator of natural laws means to
him to make human mind the creator of the world. How then the
logical salto is made to the deity as the creator must remain an enigma
to the -ansophisticated reader.
Two pages earlier he writes:
"The really important epistemological question that divides the philosophical trends is
whether the source of our knowledge of these
connections is objective natural law or properties of our mind, its
inate faculty bf apprehending certain a priori truths, and so forth.
This is what s'o irrevocably divides the materialists Feuerbach, Marx
and Engels from the agnostic (Humeans) Avenarius and Macht' (159).

. ..

That Mach should ascribe to the human mind the power to disclose
certain aprioristic truths is a new discovery or rather fantasy of
Lenin. Where Mach deals with the practice of the mind to abstract
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general rules from experience and to assign to them unlimited validity,
henin, captivated by traditional philosophical ideas, thinks of disclosing aprioristic truths. Then he &ntinues :

- "In certain parts of his works, Mach

...

frequently 'forgets' his
agreement with Hume and his own subjectivist theory of causality
and argues 'simply' as a scientist, i.a, from the instinctive materialist standpoint. For instance, in his Mechadc, we read of the 'uniwhich nature teaches us to find in its phenomena' But
formity
if we do find uniformity in the phenomena of nature, does this mean
!&hat uniformity exists objectively outside- our mind? No. On the
question of the uniformity of nature Mach also delivers himself
thus:. ..'That we consider ourselves capable of making predictions
. .;$with the help of such a law only proves that there is sufficient unilbrmity in our environment, but it does not prove the necessity of
the success of our predictions' (WErmelehre, S.383). It follows that
:We may and ought to look for a necessity apart from the d o m i t y
.L, 4
of our environment, ie., of nature" (160).

.. .
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;$The embroilment in this tangle of sentences, further embellished
by courtesies here omitted is undemtandable only when conformity of
nature is identical for Lenin with the necessity of success of our prophecies; when, hence, he cannot distinguish between regularities as
they occur in various degrees of clearness in nature, and the apodietic
expressi6n of exact natural law. And he proceeds:
r

.

h9'Where to look for it is the secret of idealist philosophy which is
e man's perceptive faculty as a simple reflection of

.
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there i s no necessity, except in our formulation of natural
law; and then in practice ever again we find deviations, which, again,
we express in the form of additional laws. Natural law does not determine what nature necessarily will do, but what we expect her to do.
The silly remark that our mind should simply reflect nature we may
bave undiacussed now. His concluding remark:
"In his last work, Erkenntnis und Irrtnm, Mach even defines a law
of nature as a 'limitation of expectation' (fZ.Auflage, S.450 ff.)! Solipsism claims its own" (160).

This lacks all sense since the determination of our expectation by
natural law is a common affair of all scientists. The embodiment of
a number of phenomena in a short formula, a natural law, is denoted
by Mach as "economy of thinking"; he exalts it into a principle of
research. We might expect that such a reducing of abstract theory
to the practice of (scientific) labor should find sympathy among
Marxists. I n lienin, however, it meets with no response, and he exposes his lack of understanding in some drolleries:

*%jj?:$$&g!!@
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"That it is more 'economical' to 'think' that only I and my sensatibns exist is unquestionable, provided we want t o introduce such an
absurd conception info episteomology. Is it 'more economical' to
'think' of the atom as indivisible, or as composed of positive and negative. electrons? Is it 'more economical' to think of the Russian bourgeois revolution a s being conducted by the liberals or as being conducted against the liberals? One has only to put the question in order
to see the absurdity, the subjectivism of applying the &gory of
'the economy of thbught' here" (171).

And he opposes to it his own view:
"Human thought is 'economical' only when it correctly reflects objective truth, and the criterion of this correctness is practice, experiment and industry. Only by denying objective reality, that is, by
denying the foundations of Marxism, can one seriously speak bf economy of thought in the theory of knowledge" (171).

How simple and evident that looks. Let us take an example. The
old ptolemaic world-system placed the earth as resting in the centre
of the world, with the sun and the planets revolving around it, the
latter in epicycles, a combination of two circles. Copernicus placed
the sun in the centre and had the earth and the planets revolving
around it in simple circles. The visible phenomena are exactly the
same after both theories, because we can observe the relative motions
only, and they are absolutely identical. Which, then, pictures the
objective world in the right way? Practical experience cannot distingpish between them; the predictions are identical. Copernicus
pointed to the fixed stars .which by the parallax could give a decision ;
but in the old theory we could have the stars making a yearly circle
just as the planets did; and again both theories give identical results.
But then everybody will say: it is absurd to have all those thousands
of bodies describe similar circles, simply to keep the earth a t rest.
Why absurd? Because it makes our world-picture needlessly complicated. Here we have it: the Copernican system is chosen and stated
to be true because it gives the most simple world system. This example
may suffice to show the naivite of the idea that we choose a theory
because after the criterion of experience it pictures reality rightly.
Kirchhoff has formulated the real character of scientific theory
in the same way by hie well-known statement that mechanics, instead
of "explaining" motions by means of the "forces" producing them,
has the task "to describe the motions in nature in the most complete
and simple way." Thus the fetishism of forces as causes, as a kind
of working imps, was removed; they are a short form of description
only. Mach of course pointed to thewanalogy of Kirchhoff's views
and his own. Lenin, to show that he does not understand anything
of it, because he is entirely captivated in this fetishism, calls out in
an indignant tone : "Economy of thought, " from which Mach in 1872
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inferred that sensations alone exist . . . is declared to be . . . equivalent to the simplest description (of an objective reality, the -existence
of which it never occurred to Kirchhoff to doubt !) " (172).
It must be remarked, besides, that thinking never can picture
reality completely; theory is an approximate picture that renders only
the main features, the general traits of a g m p of phenomena.
After having considered lienin's ideas on matter and natnral
laws, we take as a third instance space and time.
"Behold now the 'teachings' of 'recent positivism' on this subject.
We read in Mach: 'Space and time are well ordered (wohlgebrdnete)
systems of series of sensations" (Mechanik, 3. Auflage, S.498). This
is palpable idealist nonsense, such as inevitably follows from the
doctrine that bodies are complexes of sensations. According to Mach,
it is not man with his sensations that exists in space and time, but
space and time that exist in man, that depend upbn man and are
generated by man. He feels that he is falling into idealism, and
'resists' by making a host of reservations and
burying the queson the mutability of our conception under lengthy disquisitions
tions of space and time. But this does not save him, and cannot save
him, for one can really overcbme the idealist position on this question
only by recognizing the objective reality of space and time. And this
Mach will not do a t any price. He constructs his epistemological
theory of time and space on the principle of relativism, and that is
all. Resisting the idealist conclusions which inevitably foll'ow from
his premises, Mach argues against Kant and insists that our conception of space is derived from experience (Erkenntnis und Irrtum, 2.
Auflage S. 530, 385). But if objective reality is not given us in experience (as Mach teaches)
." (179).

...

...

..

What is the use of going on quoting? It is all r sham battle, because we know that Mach assumes the reality of the world; and all
phenomena, constituting the world, take place in space and time. And
Lenin could have been warned that he was on a false track, by a
number of sentences he knows and partly quotes, where Mach discusses the mathematical investigations on multi-dimensional spaces.
There Mach says: "That which we call space is a special real case
among more general imagined cases . . . The space of vision and touch
is a threefold manifold, it has three dimensions . . . The properties
of given space appear directly as objects of experience . . . About the
given space only experience can teach us whether it is finite, whether
parallel lines intersect, etc. . . .To many divines who do not know
where to place hell, and to spiritists, a fourth dimension might be
very convenient. " But "such a fourth dimension would still remain
a thing of imagination." These quotations may suffice. What has
Lenin to say to all this, besides a number of groundless squibs and
invectives f

,

how does he (Mach) dissociate himself from them in his theory
of knowledge? By stating that three-dimensional space alone is real!
But what sort bf defence is it against the theologians and their like
when you deny objective reality to space and time?" (183).

What difference might there be between real space and objective
reality of space? At any rate he sticks to his error.
What, then, is that sentence of Mach that was the basis of this
fantasy l In the last chapter of his "Mechanik," Mach discusses the
relation between different branches of science. There he says : "First
we perceive that in all experiences on spatial and temporal relations
we have more confidence, and a more objective and real character is
ascribed to them, than to experiences on color, heat or sound . . . Yet,
looking more exactly, we cannot fail to see that sensations on space
and time are sensations just as those of color, soupd or smell; only,
in the former we are more trained and clear than in the latter. Space
and time are well-ordered systems of series of sensations . . .". Mach
proceeds here from experience; our sensations are the only source
of knowledge; our entire world, including all we know about space
and time, is built up out of them. The question of what is the meaning of absolute space and time is to Mach a meaningless question;
the only sensible question is how space and time appear in our experience. Jnst as with bodies and matter we can form a scientific
conception of time and space only through abstraction out of the totality of our experiences. With -the space-and-time p a t t e d in which
we insert these experiences we are versed, as most simple and natural,
from early youth. How it then appears in experimental science cannot
be expressed in a better way than by the words of Mach: well-ordered
sptems of series of experiences.
What, contrariwise, Lenin thinks of space and time, transpires
from the following quotation :

-

"In modern physics, he says, Newton's idea of absolute time and
space prevails (pp. 442-44)' of time and space as such. This idea
seems 'to us' senseless, Mach continues-apparently not suspecting
the existence of materialists and of a materialist theory of knowledge.
But in practice, he claims, this view was harmless ( u n ~ c ~ d l i c h ,
p. 442) and therefore for a long time escaped criticism', (180).

Hence, according to Lenin, ''materialism " accepts Newton 's doctrine, the basis of which is that there exists an absolute space and an
absolute time. This means that the place in space is fixed absolutely,
without regard to other things, and can be ascertained without any
doubt. When Mach s a p that this is the point of view of contemporary
physicikts he surely represents his colleagues as too old-fashioned; in

his time already it was rather generally accepted that motion and
rest were relative conceptions, *at the place of a body is always the
place relative to other bodies, and that the idea of absolute position
has no sense.
Still there was a certain doubt whether or not space-filling worldether did not offer a frame for absolute space; motion or rest relative
to worlbether could be rightly called then absolute motion or rest.
When, however, physicists tried to determine it by means of the propagation of light, they could find nothing but relativity. Such was the
case with Michelson's famous experiment in 1889, arranged in such
a way that in its result nature should indioate the motion of our earth
relative to the ether. But nothing was found; nature remained mute.
It was as if she said: your query has no sense. To explain the negative result it was assumed that there always occurred additional phenomena that just cancelled the expected effect-until Einstein in 1905
in his theory of relativity combined dl facts in such a way that the
result was self-evident. Also within the world-occupying ether absolute position was shown to be B word without meaning. So gradually
the idea of ether itself wae dropped, and all thought of absolute space
disappeared from science.
With time it seemed to be different; a moment in time was assumed to be absolute. But it was the very ideas of Mach that brought
about a change here. I n the place of talk of abstract conceptions,
Einstein introduced the practice of experiment. What are we doing
when we fix a moment in timet We look at a clock, and we compare
the different clocks; there is no other way. I n following this lihe of
argument Einstein succeeded in refuting absolute time and demonstrating the relativity of time. Einstein's theory was soon universally
adopted by scientists, with the exception of some anti-semitic physicists in Germany who consequently were proclaimed luminaries of
national-socialist ''German '' physics.
The latter development could not yet be known to Lenin when he
wrote his book. But it illustrates the character of such expositions
as where he writes:
5

"The materialist view of space and time has remained 'Harmless,'
i.e., compatible, as heretofore, with science, while the contmry view
of Mach and Co, was a 'harmful' capitulation to the position of fideism'' (183).

Thus he denotes as materialist theabelief that the concepts of absolute space and absolute time, which science once wanted as its theory

but had to drop afterwards, are the true reality of the world. (*)
Because Mach opposes their reality and asserts for space and time the
same as for every concept, viz. that we can deduce them only from
experience, Lenin imputes to him "idealism leading to 'f ideism '.' ?
Materialism

Our direct concern here is not with Mach but with Lenin. Mach
occupies considerable space here because Lenin's criticism of Mach
discloses his own philosophical views. Prom the side of Marxism
there is enough to criticise in Mach; but Lenin takw up the matter
from the wrong end. As we have seen he appeals to the old forms of
physical theory, diffused into popular opinion, so as to oppose them
against the modern critique of their own foundations. We found,
moreover, that he identifies the real objective world with physical
matter, as Aiddle-class materialism did formerly. He tries to demonstrate it by the following arguments:
"If p u hold that it is given, a philosophical concept is needed for
this objective reality, a d this concept has been worked but long,
long ago. !Ms concept is matter. Matter is a philosophical category
designating the objective reality which is given to man by his sensations, and which is copied, photographed and reflected by bur sensations, while existing independently of them" (123).

Fine; with the first sentence we all can agree. When then, ,however, we would restrict the character of reality to physical matter,
we contradict the first given definition. Electricity too is objective
reality; is it physical matter? Our sensations show us light; it is
reality but not matter; and the concepts introduced by the physicists
t o explain its phenomena, first the world-ether, then the photons,
can not easily be denoted as a kind of matter. I s not energy quite as
real as is physical matter l More directly than the material things,
it is their energy that shows itself in all experience and produces our
(*) These obsolete ideas as an essential part of Leninism QS the Russian
State-philosophy, were afterwards imposed upbn R u s s h science, as may
be inferred from the following communication in Waldemar Kaempf ert
"Science in Soviet-Russia": "Toward the end of the Trotsky purge, the
Astronomical Division of the Academy of Sciences passed some impassibned
resolutions, which were signed by the president and eighteen members and
which declared that 'modern bourgeois cosmogmy is in a state of deep
ideological confusibn resulting from its refusal to accept the only true
dialectic-materialistic concept, namely the infinity of the universe with
respect to space as well as time,' and a belief in relativity was branded as
'counter-revo1utionary.t "

sensations. For that reasonoOstwald, half a century ago, proclaimed
energy the only real substance of the world; and he called this "the
end of scientific materialism". And finally, what is given. to us in
our sensations, when fellow-men speak to us, is not only sound coming from lips and throat, not only energy of air vibrations, but besides,
more essentially, their thoughts, their ideas. Man's ideas quite as
certainly belong to objective reality as the tangible objects; things
spiritual constitute the real world just as things called material in
physics. If in our science, needed to direct our activity, we wish to
render the entire world of experience, the concept of physical matter
does not suffice ; we need more and other concepts; energy, mind,
comciousness.
If according to the above definition matter is taken as the name
for the philosophical concept. denoting objective reality, it embraces
far more than physical matter. Then we come to the view repeatedly
expressed in former chapters, where the material world was spoken
of as the name for the entire observed reality. This is the meaning
of the word materia, matter in Historical Materialism, the designation of all that is really existing in the world, "including mind and
fancies," as Dietzgen said. It is not, therefore, that the modern theories of the structure of matter provoke criticism of his ideas, as Lenin
indicates above on the same page, but the fact that he identifies physical matter a t all with the real world.
The meaning of the word matter in Historical Materialism, as
pointed out here, is of course entirely foreign to Lenin; contrary to
his first definition he will restrict it to physical matter. Hence his
attpck on Dietzgen 's ''confusion '' :
-"Thinking is a fundibn of the brain, says Dietzgen. 'My desk as a
picture in my mind is identical with my idea of it. But my desk outside of my brain is a separate object and distinct from my 'idea.'
These perfectly clear materialistic propositions are, however, supplemented by Dietzgen thus: 'Nevertheless, the non-sensible idea is also
sensible, material, i.e., real
This is obviously false. That both
thought and matter are 'real,' i.e., exist, is true. But to say that
thought is material is to make a false step, a step towards confusing
materialism and idealism. As sr matter of fact this is only an inexact
expression of Dietzgen" (249).

. . .'.

Here Lenin repudiates his own definition of matter as the philosophical expression of objective reality. Or is perhaps objective reality
something different from really existing? What he tries to express
-but
cannot without "inexactness of expression ''-is
this : that
thoughts may really exist, but the true genuine reality is only found
in physical matter.

Middle-clam materialism, identifying objective reality with phyaioal matter, had to make every other reality, such as all things spiritual, an attribute or property of this matter. We cannot wonder,
therefore, that we find with Lenin similar ideas. To Pearson's sentence: "It is illogical to aasert that all matter has conscionmess" he
remarks :
"It is illogical to assert that all matter is conscious but it is logical
to assert that all matter possesses a property which is essentially
akin to sensation, the property of reflectibn" (88).

And still more distinctly he avers against Mach :

...

"As regards materialism,
we have already seen in the case of
Diderot (*) what the real views of the materialists are. These views
do not consist in deriving sensation from the movement of matter
or in reducing sensation to the movement 'of matter, but in recognizing sensation.as one of the prope*ies of matter in motion. On this
question Engels shared the standpoint of Diderot" (40).

Where Engels may have said so, is not indicated. We may doubt
whether Lehin's conviction that Engels on this point agreed with him
and Diderot, rests on precise statements. I n his "Anti-Diihring"
Engels expressed himself in another way: "Life is the form of existence of albuminous substances"; i.e. life is not a property of all matter but appears only in such complicated molecular structures as
albumen. So it is not probable that he should have considered sensitiveness, which we know as a property of living matter only, a property
of all matter. Such generalizations of properties observed only in
special cases, to matter in general, belong to the mdialectic middleclass frame of mind.
The remark may be inserted here that Plechanov exhibits ideas
analogous to Lenin's. In his "Grundprobleme des Marxismus" he
criticizes the botanist Franc& on the subject of the "spirituality of
matter,'' the "doctrine that matter in general and organic matter
especially always has a certain sensitivity." Plechanov then expresses
his own view in the words : "Francs considers this contradictory to
materialism. I n reality it is the transfer of Feuerbach's materialistic
doctrine. We may assert with certainty that Marx and Engels would
have given attention to this trend of thought with the greatest interest." This is a cautious assertion testifying that Marx and Engels
in their writings never showed any interest i~ this trend of thought.
(*) Diderot, one of the Encyclbpaedists of the 18th century, had written

"that the faculty of sensation is a general property of matter, or a product
of its organization" (Lenin p 29). The wider scope admitted in the latter
expression was dropped by Lenin.
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Frand as a limited-minded naturalist knows only the antithesh of
views in middle-class thinking; he assumes that materialists believe
in matter only, hence the doctrine that in all matter there is something spiritual is, to him, no materialism at all. Plechanov, on the
other hand, considers it a small modification of materialism that makes
it more resistant.
Lenin was quite well aware of the concordance of his views with
middle-clas*smaterialism of the 19th century. For hi^ "materialism"
is the common basis of Marxism and middle-class materialism. After
having expounded that Engels in his booklet on Fenerbach charged
these materialists with three things,-that they remained with the
materialist doctrine of the 18th century, that their materialism was
mechanical, and that in the realm of social science, they held faat to
idealism and did not understand Historical Materialism-he proceeds :
"Exclusively for these three things and exclusively within these
limits, does Engels refute both the materialism of the eighteenth
century and the doctrines of Biichner and Co.! On all other, more
elementary, questions of materialism (questions distorted by the
Machians) there is and-can be no difference between Marx and
Engels on the one hand and all these bld materialists on the other"
(246).

That this is an illmion of Lenin's has been demonstrated in the
preceeding pages; these three things carry along as their consequences
an utter difference in the fnhdamental epistemological ideas. And in
the same way, Lenin continues, Engels was in accordance with Diihring in hie materialism:

...

"For Engels
Diihring was not a sufficiently steadfast, clear and
cornistent materialist" (247).

Compare this with the way Engels finished Dtihring off in words
of scornful contempt.
Lenh's concordance with middle-class materialimn and his ensuing discordance with ELis$orical Materialism is manifest in man3 consequences. The former waged its main war against religion; and the
chief reproach Lenin raises against Mach and his followers is that
they sustain fideism. We met with it in several quotations already;
in h u n h ~ d sof places all through the book we find fideism as the
opposite of materialism. Marx and Engels did not know of fideism:
they drew the line between materialism and idealism. In the name
fideiem emphasis is laid upon religion. Lenin explains whence he
took the word. "In France, those who put faith above reason are
called fideists (from the Latin fides, faith) " (263).
This oppositeness of religion to reason is a reminiscence from premarxian times, from the emancipation of the middle-cl-,
appealing

to "reason" in order to attack religions faith as the chief enemy in
the social struggle ; ''free thinking " was opposed to "obscurantism. ''
Lenin, in continually pointing to fideism as the -consequence of the
contested doctrines indicates that also to him in the world of ideas
religion is. the chief enemy.
Thus he scolds Mach for saying that the problem of determinism
cannot be settled empirically: in research, Mach says, every scientist
must be determinist but in practical affairs he remains indeterminist.

...

"Is this not obscurantism
when determinism is confined to the
field of 'investigation,' while in the field of morality, social activity,
and all fields other than 'investigation' the question is left to a 'sub"Apd m things have been amicably dijective' estimate" (193).
vided: theory for the professors, practice for the theologians!" (194).

...

Thus every subject is seen from the point of view of religion. Manifestly it was unknown to Lenin that the deeply religious Calvinism
was a rigidly deterministic doctrine, whereas the materialist middleclass of the 19th century put their faith into free will, henc;! proclaimed indeterminism. At this point a real Marxian thinker would
not have missed the opportunity of explaining to the Rus&q,Mar?hists
that it was Historical Materialism that opened the way for determinism $ the field of society; we have shown above that the theoretical
conviction that rules and laws hold in a realm-this means determinism-can find a foundation only when we succeed in establishing
practically such laws and connections. Further, that Mach because
he belonged to the middle class end was bound to its fundamental line
of thought, by necessity was indeterminist in his social views; and
that in this way his ideas were backward and incompatible with Marxism. But nothing of the sort is found in Lenin; that ideas are determined by class is not mentioned ; the theoretical differences hang in .
the air. Of course theoretical ideas must be criticized by theoretical
arguments. When, however, the social consequences are emphasized
with such vehemence, the social. origins of the contested ideas should
not have been left out of consideration. This most essential character
of Marxism does not seem to exist for Lenin.
So we are not astonished that among former authors it is especially Ernest Haeckel who is esteemed and praised by Lenin. I n a
final chapter inscribed "Ernst Haeckel and Ernst Mach" he compares and opposes them. "Mach . . . betrays science into the hands of
fideism by virtually deserting to the camp of philosophical idealism"
(361). But ''every page " in Haeckel 's work "is a slap in the face of
the 'sacred ' teachings of aU official philosophy and theology. '' Haeckel
"instantly, easily and simply revealed . . . that there is a foundation.
This foundation is natural-scientific materialism" (364).

I n his praise it does not disturb him that the writings of Haeckel
combine, as generally recognized, popular science with a most superf icial philosophy-Lenin himself speaks of his "philosophical naivit8 ''
and says "that he does not enter into an investigation of philosophical
fundamentals." What i s essential to him is that Haeckel was a dauntless fighter against prominent religious doctrines.
"The storm provoked by Ernst Haeckel's "The Riddle of the Universe" in every civilized country strikingly brought out, on the one
hand, the partisan chamcter bf philosophy in modern society and, on
the other, the true socid significance of the struggle of materialism
against idealism and agnosticism. The fact that the book was sold
in hundreds of thousands of copies, that it was immediately translated into all languages and that it appeared in special cheap editions, clearly demonstrates that the bobk 'has found its way to the
masses,' that there are numbers of readers whom, Ernst Haeckel at
once won over to his side. This popular little book became a weapon
in the class struggle. The professors of philosophy and theology in
every country of the world set about denouncing and annihilating
Haeckel in every possible way" (362).

What class-fight was this? Which class was here represented by
Haeckel against which other classt Lenin is silent on this point.
Should his words be taken to imply that Haeckel, unwittingly, acted
as a spokesman of the working class against the borgeoisie? Then it
must be remarked that Haeckel was a vehement opponent to socialism,
and $hat in his defense of Darwinism he tried to recommend it to the
ruling class by pointing out that it was an aristocratic theory, the
dpctrine of the selection of the best, most fit to refute "the utter nonsense of socialist levelling." What Lenin calls a tempest raised by
the "Weltraetsel" was in reality only a breeze within the middle -class.
the last episode of its conversion from materialism to idealistic world
conception. Haeckel's "Weltraetsel" was the last flare up, in a weakened form, of middle-class materialism, and the idealist, mystic, and
religious tendencies were so strong already among the bourgeoisie and
the intellectuals that from all sides they could pounce upon Haeckel's
book and show up its deficiencies. What was the importance of the
book for the mass of its readers among the working class we have
indicated above. When Lenin speaks here of a class fight he demonstrates how little he knew of the class fight in countries of developed
capitalism, and saw it only as a fight for and against religion.

Plechanov 's Views
The kinship with middle-class materialism revealed in Lenin's
book is not simply a personal deviation from Marxism. Analogous
views are found in Plechanov, a t the time the acknowledged first and
prominent theorist of Russian socialism. I n his book "Grundprobleme

(p"nndmental Problems of Marxism), first written
with a Gem- translation in 1910, he begins by broadly
concordance between Marx and Feuerbach. What usually
tm
is called Feuerbach's Hum-,
he explains, meam that Fmerbach
proceeds from man to matter. "The words of Feuerbach qnoted above
on the 'human head ' show 4 that the question of 'brain matter ' wes
answered at the time in a materialist sense. And this point of view
was also accepted by Marx and Engels. It became the basis of their
philosophy." -Of course Marx and Engels assumed that human
thoughts are produced in the brain, just ss they assumed that the
earth revolved around the sun. Plechanov, however, proceeds : "When ,T
we deal with this thesis of Feuerbaoh, we get acquainted at the same
time with the philosophicaZ aide of Marxism." He then quotes the
sentences of Feuerbach: "Thinking comes from being, but being
comes not from thinking. Being exists in itself and by itself, existence
has its basis in itself;" and he cona].udes by adding "Ma= and Engels
made this opinion on the relation between bqgbg and thinking the
basis of their materiaht conception of histoe." Surely; but the
queation is what they mean by "being." In this colorless word many
opposing concepts of later times are contained undistinguished. All
that is perceptible to ns we call being; from the side of natural science
it can mean matter' from the side of social science the esme word can
mean the entire society. To Peaerbach it was the material substwe
of m e : "man is what he eatsv; to Marx it is social reality? i.e. a
aociety of people, tools, production-relations, that determines conmioixmeas.
Plechanov then speaks of the first of Marx's theses oh Feuerbach;
he says that Marx here "cadopletes and deepens Feuerbach's ideas" ;
he explains that F e u e r h h took man in his pawive relations, Ma= in
his active relation to nature. He points to the later statement in ''Das
Kapital": ''Whilet maa works upon outside nature and changes it,
he changes at the same time 6is own nature," and he adds: "The
profundity of this thought becomes clear in the light of Marx'a theory
of knowledge. . It must be admitted, though, that Marx's theory of
knowledge is a direct offspring af Feuerbach's or, more rightly, represents Feuerbach's theory of knowledge which, then, has been deepened by Manc in a masterly way." And again, on the next page, he
speaks of "modern materialimn, the materialism of Feuerbach, Marx
and Engels." What must be admitted, rather, is that the ambiguous
sentence: being determines thought, is common to them, and that the
materialist doctrine that brain produces thought is the most messential part of Marxism and contains no trm yet of a real theory of
knowledge.
The essential side of Marxism is what distinguished it from other
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materialist theories and what makes them the expression of different
class struggles. Feuerbach's theory of knowledge, belonging to the
fight for emancipation of the middle class, has its basis in the lack of
science of soieew as the most powerful reality determining human
thinking. llhwxian theory of knowledge proceeds from the action of
society, this self-made material world of man, upon the mind, and
so belongs to the proletarian class struggle. Certainly Marx's theory
of knowledge descended, historically, from Hegel and Feuerbach ; but
equally certainly it grew into something entirely different from Hegel
and Feuerbach. It is a significant indication of the point of view of
Plechanov that he does not see this antagonism and that he assigns
the main importance to the trivial community of opinion-which is
unimportant for the real issue-that thoughts are produced by the
brain.

THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION
The concordance of Lenin and Plechanov in their basic philosophical views and their common divergence from M d m points to
their common origin out of the Russian social conditions. The name
and garb of a doctrine or theory depend on its spiritual degent; they
indicate the earlier thinker to whom we feel most indebted and whom
we think we follow. The real content, however, depends on its material origin and is determined by the social conditions under which it
developed and has to work. Marxism itself says that the main social
ideas and spiritual trends express the aims of the classes, i.e. the needs
of social development, and change with the class struggles themselves.
So they cannot be understood isolated from society and class struggle.
This holds for Marxism itself.
I n their early days Marx and Engels stood in the first ranks of
the middle-class opposition, not yet disjoined into its different social
trends, against absolutism in Germany. Their development towards
Historical Materialism, then, was the theoretical reflex of the development of the working class towards independent action against the
bourgeoisie. The practical class-antagonism found its expression in
the theoretical antagonism. The fight of the bourgeoisie against feudal
dominance was expressed by middle-class materialism, cognate to
Fenerbach 's doctrine, which used natural science to fight religion as
the consecration of the old powers. The working class in its own fight
has little use for natural science, the instrument of its foe; its theoretical weapon is social science, the science of social development. To

fight religion by means of natural science has no significance for the
workers; they know, moreover, that its roots will be cut off anyhow
first by capitalist development, then by their own class struggle.
Neither have they any use for the obvious fact that thoughts are produced by the brain. They have to understand how ideas are produced
by society. This is the content of Marxism, as it grows among the
workers as a living and stirring power, as the theory expressing their
growing power of organization and knowledge. When in the second
half of the 19th century capitalism gained complete mastery in Western and Central Europe as well as in America, middle-class materialism disappeared. Marxism was the only materialist class-view remaining.
I n Russia, however, matters were different. Here the fight against
Czarism was analogous to the former fight against absolutism in
Europe. I n Russia too church and religion were the strongest supports of the system of government ;they held the rural masses, engaged
in primitive agrarian production, in complete ignorance and superstition. The struggle pgainst religion was here a prime social necessity. Since in Russia there was no significant bourgeoisie that as a
future ruling class could take u p the fight, the task fell to the intelligentsia; during scores of years it waged a strenuous fight for enlightenment of the masses against Czarism. Among the Western
bourgeoisie, now reactionary and anti-materialist, it could find no
support whatever in this struggle. It had to appeal to the socialist
workers, who alone sympathized with it, and. it took over their acknowledged theory, Marxism. Thus it came about that even intellectuals
who were spokesmen of the first rudiments of a Russian bourgeoisie,
such as Peter ~ t r u v eand Tugan Baranovski, presented themselves as
Marxists. They had nothing in common with the proletarian Marxism
of the West; what they learned from Marx was the doctrine of social
development with capitalism
the next phase. A power for revolution came u p in Russia for the first time when the workers took u p
the fight, first by strikes only, then i n combination with political
demands. Now the intellectuals found a revolutionary class to join
u p with, in order to become its spokesmen in a socialist party.
Thus the proletarian class struggle in Russia was a t the sanie time
a struggle against Czarist absolutism, under the banner of socialism.
So Marxism in Russia, developing as the theory of those engaged in
the social conflict, necessarily assumed another character than in
Western Europe. It was still the theory of a fighting working clam;
but this class had to fight first and foremost for what in Western
Europe had been the function and work of the bourgeoisie, with the
intellectuals as its associates. So the Russian intellectuals, in adapting the theory to this local task, had to find a form of Marxism in

which criticism of religion stood in the forefront. They found it in
an approach to earlier forms of materialism, and in the first writings
of Marx from the time when in Germany the fight of the bourgeoisie
and the workers against absolutism was still undivided.
This appears most clearly in Pleehanov, the "father of Russian
Marxism." At the time that in Western countries theorists occupied
themselves with political problems, he turned his attention to the older
materialists. I n his ''Beitrage m r Qeschichte des Materialismus ?
(Contributions to the History of Materialism) he treats the French
materialists of the 18th century, Helvetius, Lamettrie, and compares
them with Marx, to show how many valuable irnd important ideas
were already contained in their works. Hence we understand why in
his ''Grundprobleme des Marxismus" he stresses the concordance
between Marx and Feuerbach and emphasizes the view points of middle-class materialism.
Yet Plechanov was strongly influenced by the Western, especially
the German workers', movement. He was known as the herald of the
Russian working-class struggle, which he predicted theoretically at
a time when practically there was hardly any trace. He was esteemed
as one of the very few who occupied themselves with philosophy; he
played an international role and took part in the discussions on Marxism and reformism. Western socialists studied his writings without
perceiving a t the time the differences hidden within them. Thus he
was determined by Russian conditions less exclusively than Lenin.
Lenin was the practical leader of the Russian revolutionary movement. Hence in his theoretical ideas its practical conditions and political aims are shown more clearly. The conditions of the fight against
Czarism determined the basic views exposed in his book. Theoretical,
especially philosophic views are not determined by abstract studies
and chance reading in philosophical literature, but by the great lifetaski which, imposed by the needs of practical activity, direct the
will and thought of man. To Lenin and the Bolshevist party the first
life-task was the annihilation of Czarism and of the backward barbarous social system of Russia. Church and religion were the theoretical
foundations of that system, the ideology and glorification of absolutism, expression and symbol of the slavery of the masses. Hence a
relentless fight against them was needed ; the struggle against religion
stood in the center of Lenin's theoretical thought; any concession
however small to "fideism" was an attack on the life-nerve of the
movement. As a fight against absolutism, landed property, and clergy,
the fight in Russia was very similar to the former fight of bourgeoisie
and intellectuals in Western Europe; so the thoughts and fundamental ideas of Lenin must be similar to what had been propagated
in middle-class materialism, and his sympathies went to its spokesmen.
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however, it was the working class who had to wage the
fight; so the fighting organization had to be a socialist party, proclaiming Marxism as its creed, and taking from Marxism what was
necessary for the Russian Revolution : the doctrine of social development from capitalism to socialism, and the doctrine of class war as
its moving force. Hence Lenin gave to his materialism the name and
garb of Marxism, and assumed it to be the real-i.e. peculiarly working-class as contrasted with middle-class-Marxism.
This identification was supported by - still another circumstance.
I n Russia capitalism had not grown up gradually from small-scale
production in the-hands of a middle class, as it had in Western
Europe. Big industry was imported from outside as a foreign element
by Western capitalism exploiting the Russian workers. Moreover
Western financial capital, by its loans to Czarism, exploited the entire
agrarian Russian people, who were heavily taxed to pay the interests.
Western capital here assumed the character of colonial capital, with
the Cear and his officials as its agents. In corntries exploited as colonies all the classes have a common interest in throwing off the yoke
S
capital, to establish their own free economic
of the R ~ O U foreign
development, leading ss a rule to home capitidism. This fight is
waged against world-capital, hence often under the name of socialism;
and the workers of the Western countries, who stand against the same
foe, are the natural allies. Thus in China Sun-Pat-Sen was a socialist ;
since, however, the Chinese bourgeoisie whose spokedman he was, was
a numerous and powerful class, his s o c i a b was "national" and he
opposed the ''errors2 ' of M a d m .
Lenin, on the contrary, had to rely on the working class, and became his fight bad to be implacable and radical, he espoused the most
radical ideology of the Western proretariiat fkhting world-capitalism,
viz, Marxism. Since, however, the Russian revolution showed a mixture of two characters, midd].eolass revolution in its immediate aims,
proletarian revolution in its active forces, the appropriate bolshevist
theory too had to present two characters, middle-class materialism in
its basic philosophy, proletarian evolutionism in its doctrine of class
fight. This mixture was termed Marxism. But it is clear that Lenins
Marxism, as d e t e d e d by the special Russian attitude toward capitalism, must be fundamentally different from the real Marxism growing as their basic view in the workers of the countries of big capitalism. Marxism in Western Europe & the world view of a working class
confronting the task of converting s most highly developed capitalism, its own world of life and action, into communism. The Russian
workers and intellectuaIs could not make this' their object; they had

first to open the way for a free development of a modern industrial
society (*). To the Rntssian marxists the nucleus of Marxism is not
contained in' M8nc's the& that social reality determines consciousness, but in the sentence of young Marx, inscribed in big letters in
the Moscow People's House, that religion is the opium of the people.
It may happen that in a theoretical work there appear not the
immediate surroundings and tasks of the author, but more general
and remote influences and wider tasks. I n Lenin's book, however,
nothing of the sort ie perceptible. It is .a manifest and exclusive
reflection of the Russian Revolution at which he was aiming. Its
character so entirely corresponds to middle-class materialism that, if
it had been known at the time in Western Europe-but only confused
rumors on the internal strifes of Russian socialism penetrated hereand if it could have been rightly interpreted, one could have predicted
that the Russian revolution must somehow result in a kind of capitalism based on a workers' struggle.
There is a widespread op&n that the bolshevist party was marxkt, and that it was only for practical reasons that Lenin, the great
scholar and leader of Marxism, gave to the revolution another direction than what Western workers called commdsm-thereby showing
hie realistic marxian insight. The critical opposition to the Russian
and C.P. politics tries indeed to oppose the despotic practice of the
present Bnssian government-termed Stalinism-to the ''true " Marxist principles of Lenin and old Bolshevism. Yrongly so. Not only
beoanse in practice these politics were inaugurated already by Lenin.
But also because the alleged Marxism of Lenin and the bolshevist
par@ is nothing but a legend. Lenin never knew r e d Marxism.
Whence ahodd he have taken it? Capitalism he knew only as colonial
cspitalism; social revolution he knew only as the annihilation of big
land ownership and Czarist despotism. Russian bolshevism cannot be
reproached for having abandoned the way of Marxism; for it was
never on that way. Every page of Lenin's philosophical work is there
to prove it; and Marxism itself, by its thesis that theoretical opinions
are determined by social relations and necessities, makes clear that it
could not be otherwise. Marxism, however, at the same time shows
the necessity of the legend; every middle-class revolution, requiring
working class and peasant support, needs the illusion that it is something different, larger, more universal. Here it was the illusion that
(*) Bolshevist historians, since they. knew capitalism only in the charscter of colonial capitalism, were keen in recognizing the pole of colonial
capital in the mrld, and wer6 able to write excellent studies on it. But at
the same time they readily overlooked its difference from home capitalism.

m u s Prokrovski in his "History of Russia" represents 1917 as the end of
a Russian capitalist development bf many centuries.

the Russian revolution was the first step of world revolution liberating the entire proletarian class from capitalism; its theqretical expression was the legend of Marxism.
Of course Lenin was a pupil of Marx; from Marx he had learnt
what was most essential for the Russian revolution, the uncompromising proletarian claas struggle. Just as for analogous reasons, the
social-democrats were pupils of &rx. And surely the fight of the
Russian workers, in their mass actions and their soviets, was the most
important practical example of modern proletarian warfare. That,
however, Lenin did not understand Marxism as the theory of proletarian revolution, that he did not understand capitalism, bourgeoisie,
proletariat in their highest modern development, was shown strikingly
when from Russia, by means of the Third International, the world
revolution was to be started, and the advice and warnings of Western
Marxists were entirely disregarded. An unbroken series of blunders,
failures, and defeats, of which the present weakness of the workers'
movement was the result, showed the unavoidable shortcoming of the
Russian leadership.
Returning now to the time that Lenin wrote his book we have to
ask what then was the significance of the controversy on Machism.
The Russian revolutionary movement comprised wider circles of intellectuals than Western socialism; so part of them came under the
influence of anti-materialist middle-class trends. It was natural that
Lenin should sharply take up the fight against such tendencies. He
did not look upon them as would a Marxist who understands them as
a social phenomenon, explaining them out of their social origin, and
thus rendering them ineffectual; nowhere in his book do we find an
attempt at or a trace of such an understanding. To Lenin materialism
was the truth established by Feuerbach, Marx and Engels, and the
middle-class materialists; but then stupidity, reaction, money-interests of the bourgeoisie and the spiritual power of theology had brought
about a revulsion in Europe. Now this corruption threatened to assail
bolshevism too'; so it had to be opposed with the utmost vigor.
In this action Lenin of course was entirely right. To be sure, it
was not a question of the truth of &rx or Mach, nor whether out of
Mach's ideas something could be used in Marxisem. It was the question
whether middle-class materialism or middle-class idealism, or some
mixture, would afford the theoretical basis for the fight against
Czarism. It is clear that the ideology of a self-contented, already
declining bourgeoisie can never .fit in with a rising movement, not
even with a rising middle-class itself. It would have led to weakness,
where unfolding of the utmost vigor was necessary. Only the rigor
of materialism could make the Party hard, such as was needed for
a revolution. The tendency of Machism, somehow parallel to revision-

ism in Germany, was to break the radicalism of struggle and the solid
unity of the party, in theory and in practice. This was the danger
that Lenin saw quite clearly. "When I read it (Bogdanov's book)
I became exceedingly provoked and enraged," he wrote to Gorki,
February 1908. Indeed, we perceive this in the vehemence of his
attack upon the adversary, in every page of the work; it seems t o
have been written in a continuous fury. It is not a fundamental discussion clearing the ideas, as was, for example Engels' book against
Diihring; i t is the war-pamphlet of a party leader who has to ward
off by any means the danger to his party. So it could not be expected
that he should try really to understand the hostile doctrines; in consequence of his own m a r x i a n thinking he could only misinterpret
and misrepresent them. The only thing needed was t o knock them
down, to destroy their scientific credit, and thus to expose the.Russian
Machists as ignorant parrots of reactionary blockheads.
And he succeeded. His fundamental views were the views of the
bqlshevigt party at large, as determined by its historical task. As so
often, Lenin had felt exactly the practical exigencies. Machism was
condemned and expelled from the party. As a united body the party
could take its c6urse again, in the van of the working class, towards
the revolution.
The words of Deborin quoted in the beginning thus are only partially true. We cannot speak of a victory of Marxism, when there
is only question of a so-called refutation of middle-class idealism
through the idem of middle-class materialism. But doubtless Lenin's
book was an important feature in the history of the Party, determining in a high degree the further development of philosophic opinions
in Russia. Hereafter the revolution, under the new system of state
capitalism-a combination of middle-class materialism and the marxian doctrine of social development, adorned with some dialectic terminology-was, under the name "Leninism, " proclaimed the official
State-philosophy. It was the right doctrine for the Russian intellectuals who, now that natural science and technics formed the basis of
a rapidly developing production system under their direction, saw
the future open up before them as the ruling class of an immense
empire.

ism against religious belief is to him the theoretical fight accompanying the class struggle. The limited theoretical opposition between the
former and the later ruling class appears to him the great world fight
of ideas which he connects wi,th the proletarian class fight, the essence
and ideas of which lie far outside his view. Thna in Lenin's philosophy
the Rumian scheme is transferred upon Western Europe and America;
the anti-religions tendency of a rising bourgeoisie is transferred to
the rise of the proletariat. Just as among Qennan reformists at that
time the division was made between "reaction" and "progress" and
not according to class but according to political ideology-thu~ confusing the workers-so here it is made according to religious ideology,
between reactionaries and free-thinkers. Instead of establishing its
class-unity against bourgeoisie and State, to get mastesstery over production, the Western proletarian class $3 invited to take up the fight
against religion. If this book and these ideas of henin had been
known in 1918 among Western Marxists, surely there would have been
a more critical attitude against his tactics for world revolution.
The Third 1nternati6nal aims at a world revolution after the model
of the Russian revolution and with the same goal. The Russian economic system is state capitalism, there called state-socialism or even
co&unism, with production directed by a state bureaucracy under
the leadership of the Communist Party. The state officials, forming
the new rnling class, have the disposal over the product, hence over
the anrplns-value, whereas the workers receive wages only, thns f o m ing an exploited elass. I n this way it has been possible in the short
time of aome doeem of years to transform Russia from a primitive
barbarous country into a modern state of rapidly increasing industry
on the basis of sdvanced science and technics. According to Comm d t Party ideas, a similar revolution is needed in the capitalist
countries, with the working class again aa the active power, leading
to the overthrow of the bourgeoisie and the organization of produetion by a state bureaucracy.' The R m i a n revolution could be victorious only because a well-disciplined united bolshevist party led the
massea, and because in the party the clear insightsand the unyielding
assurance of Lenin and his friends showed the right way. Thus, in
the same way, in world revolution the workers have to follow the Communist Party, leave to it the lead and afterwards the government;
and the party members have to obey their leaders in rigid discipline.
Essential are the qualified capable party leaders, the proficient, experienced revolutionaries; what is necessary for the masses is the
belief that the party and its leaders are right.
In reality, for the working class in the countries of developed
capitalism, in Western Europe.and America, matters are entirely different. Its task is not the overthrow of a backward absolutist monar-

chy. Its task is to vanquish a ruling class commanding the mightiest
material and spiritual forces the world ever knew. Its object cannot
be to replace the domination of stockjobbers and monopolists over a
disorderly production by the domination of state officials over a production regulated from above. Its object is to be itself master of production and itself to regulate labor, the basis of life. Only then is
capitalism really destroyed. Such an aim cannot be attained by an
ignorant mass, confident followers of a party presenting itself as an
expert leadership. It can be attained only if the workers themselves,
the entire class, understand the conditions, ways and means of their
fight; when every man knows from his own judgment what to do.
They must, every man of them, act themselves, decide themselves,
hence think out and know for themselves. Only in this way will a
real class organization be built up from below, having the form of
something like workers' councils. It is of no avail that they have been
coneced that their leaders know what is afoot and have gained the
point m theoretical disoussion-an easy thing when each is acquainted
with the writings of his own party only. Out of the contest of arguments they have to form a clear opinion themselves. There is no truth
lying ready at hand that has only to be imbibed; in every new case
truth must be contrived by exertion of one's own brain.
This does not mean, of course, that every worker should judge on
scientific arguments in fields, that -can be mastered only by professional study. It means, first, that a11 workers should give attention
not pnly to their direct working and living conditions but also to the
great social issues connected with their class struggle and the organization of labor; and should know how to take decisions here. But it.
implies, secondly, a certain standard of argument in propaganda and
political strife. When the views of the opponent are rendered in a
distorted way because the willingness or the capacity to understand
them is lacking, then in the eyes of the believing adherents you may
score a success; but the only resultintended indeed in party strifeis to bind them with stronger fanaticism to the party. For the workers however, what is of importance is not the increase of power of a
party but the increase of their own capacity to seize power and to
establish their mastery over society. Only when, in arguing and discussing, the opponent is given his full pound, when in weighing arguments against one another each solid opinion is understood out of
social class relations, will the participant hearers gain such wellfounded insight as i s necessary for a working class to assure its
freedom.
The working class needs Marxism for its liberation. Just as the
results of natural science are necessary for the technical construction
of capitalism, so the results of social science are necessary for the
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organizational construction of communism. What was needed first
was political economy, that part of Marxism that expounds the etructure of capitalism, the nature of exploitation, the class-antagonism,
the tendencies of economic development. It gave, directly, a solid
basis to the spontaneously arising fight of the workers against the .
capitalist masters. Then, in the further struggle, by its theory of the
development of society from primitibe economy through capitalism
to communism, it gave confidence and enthusiasm'through the prospect of victory and freedom. When the not yet numerous workers
took up their first difficult fight, and the hopeless indifferent masses
had to be roused, this insight was the first thing needed.
When the working clam has grown more numerous, more powerful, and society is full of the proletarian class struggle, another part
of Marxism has to come to the forefront. That they should know that
they are exploited and have to fight, is not the main point any more;
they must know how to fight, how to overcome their weakness, how to
build up their uriity and strength. Their economic position is so easy
to understand, their exploitation so manifest that their unity in struggle, their common will to seize power over production should presumably result at once. What hampers them is chiefly the power of the
inherited and infused ideas, the formidable spiritual power of the
middle-class world, enveloping their minds into a thick cloud of beliefs
and ideologies, dividing them, and making them uncertain and confused. The process of enlightenment, of clearing up and vanquishing
this world of old ideas and ideologies is the essential process of building the working-class power, is the progress of revblution. Here that
part of Marxism is needed that we call its philosophy, the relation of
ideas to reality.
Among these ideologies the least significant is religion. As the
withered husk of a system of ideas reflecting conditions of a far past,
it has only an imaginary power as a refuge for all, who are frightened
by capitalist development. Its basis has been continually undermined
by capitalism itself. Middle-class philosophy then put up in its place
the belief in all those lesser idols, deified abstractions, such as matter,
force, causality in nature, liberty and progress in society. In modern
times these now forsaken idols have been replaced by new, more powerful objects of veneration : state and nation. In the struggle of the
old and the new bourgeoisies for world power, nationalism, now the
most needed ideology, rose to such power as to carry with it even
broad masses of the workers. Most important are, besides, such spiritual powers as democracy, organization, union, party, because they
have their roots in the working class itself as results of their life
practice, their own struggle. Just because there is connected with
them the remembrance of passionate exertion, of devoted sacrifices,

of feverish conerg with victory or defeat, their merit-which la wund
as a
tool to thorn particular past times and conditions--is exalted
to the belief in their abwlute excellence. That makes the transition
t o new necessities under new conditions difficult. The conditions 'of
We frequently compel the workers to take up new forms of fight;
but the old traditions can hamper snd retard it in a serious way. In
the continuous contest between inherited ideolom and practical needs,
it iE3 a e n t i a l for the workers to understand that their ideas are not
independently exiatina; t r u t h but generabations of former exper&
encer, and necessitia; that human mind always has the tendency to
atsign-to such ideas an unlimited validity, as absolutely good or bad,
venerated or hated, and thus makes the people slaves to superstition;
but that by understanding limits and conditions, superstition is vanquished and thought is made free. And, conversely, what is recognized
as the lasting interest, as the essential baais of the fight for hia class.
must be unerringly kept in mind-though without being deifiedas the brilliant guiding star in all action. This-besides its w e as
explanation of daily 'experience and class struggle-is the significance
of M8XXian philosophy, the doctrine of the connection of world and
mind, as conceived by Marx, Engels, and Dietegen; this gives strength
to the working clam to accomplish its great task of self-liberation.
Lenin's book, on the other hand, tries to ,impose upon the readers
the author's belief in the reality of abstractions. So it cannot be helpful in any way for the workers' tad. And as a matter of fact its
publication in Western languages was not meant to be that. Workers
aiming a t the self-liberation of their class stand beyond the horizon
of the Communist Party. What the Communist Party can see i s the
competitor,-the rival party, the Second Inte-ational trying to keep
the leadership over the working class. Bs Deborin wee quoted in the
. Preface, the aim of the publication was to win social-democracy, corrupted by middle-class idealistic phil~sophy,back to materialismor else to browbeat it by the more captivating radical terms of materialism-=
a theoretical contribution to the Red Front. For the
rising class-movement of the workem it matters little which of these
unmarxian party-lines of thought should get the upper hand.
But in another way Lenin's philosophy may be of importance for
their struggle. The aim of the Communist Party-which it called
world-revolution-is to bring to power, by means of the fighting force
of the workers, a layer of leaders who then establish planned production by means of State-Power; in its essence it coincides with the
aims of m i a l democracy. The social ideals growing up in the minds
of the intellectual c l w now that it feel$ its increasing importance in
the proem of production : a well-ordered organization of production
for we under the direction of technical and scientific experts-are

